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Abstract  
The Canadian Federal Government’s purchase of the Trans Mountain pipeline in 2018 was seen 
by many as a singular action to support the pipeline industry. However, this research will 
contend that this is not the case because this thesis will show that the federal government has 
indemnified the oil and gas pipeline industry in Canada over the past 60 years. This will be 
shown by focusing on three large-scale positive examples of Federal Government 
indemnification, they are the modern Trans Mountain pipeline expansion, the 1970’s building of 
Line 9 and the initial construction of the TransCanada pipeline project in the 1950’s. All of these 
cases relied on direct government fiscal and political support to indemnify the projects so that 
they could obtain financing and eventually be constructed. By using process tracing this thesis 
shows how the Canadian federal government has in essence been indemnifying all large-
scale pipeline projects throughout a large part of Canada’s history. Explanations for why this 
support has existed are then explored through a lens of industry structure, and the thesis posits 
that the pipeline industry’s structure (using the metric of industry size, firm size, profit rate, 
market concentration and geographical dispersion) is one explanatory factor as to why this policy 
of indemnification has existed in Canada for such a long period of time.  
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 1 
Introduction 
In June of 2019, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that his 
Liberal government would be purchasing the Trans Mountain pipeline and then would 
spend billions more to build its proposed expansion. The project was purchased despite 
the fact that the pipeline had seen significant protests by environmental organizations, 
Indigenous groups, cities along the pipeline and the premier of the province of British 
Columbia. The acquisition was framed by the federal government as a short-term 
purchase agreement that was both financially sound, and essential to ensuring a key 
energy infrastructure project was built (Ljunggren and Williams 2019). This was stated 
despite the project proponent and previous owner Kinder Morgan had describing the 
pipeline as an “unquantifiable risk” when describing the outlook of the project (Kinder 
Morgan 2018). Additionally, the government has been labelled a ‘reluctant buyer’ of the 
pipeline by the media and other parties (Sanzillo and Hipple 2018, 3). Within this set of 
circumstances questions therefore arise about why the federal government would put 
forward so much money on an asset that does not clearly seem to be a business. This also 
brings forward the question of what sort of public case would there be for the federal 
government to take steps to save a pipeline they have stated to be so reluctant to purchase.  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether the federal government has 
supported the oil and gas industry through indemnification since the 1950’s. 
Indemnification being defined as a government entity taking responsibility for the large-
scale liabilities faced by an industry sector overtime. It further seeks to not just confirm 
whether this form of support is taking place but asks whether the industry structure of the 
pipeline industry could provide an explanation for why this policy has continued over 
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such a period of time. It is hypothesized that the structure of the oil and gas industry, 
when looking at the five parameters proposed by Salamon and Siegfried (1977), can help 
to explain why an interest group such as the pipeline industry has benefited from this type 
of support from the federal government of Canada. The research question is pertinent 
given the historical resistance on the part of many parties against supporting pipeline 
construction projects with public money, as well as the common perception within the oil 
industry that less government involvement is preferable to create the most efficient, 
profitable industry. This apparent contradiction, along with analysis of the common 
justification of governments that indemnification was in the “national interest” will allow 
for the questioning of motives, risk-calculation by interest groups and what actors 
(interest groups, government actors etc.) are involved in decision making when it comes 
to Canada’s national oil and gas pipeline policy. 
The federal government’s decision to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline has 
been painted as an unprecedented action on the part of the government by many 
politicians and journalists (Connolly and Ferreras 2019).  While it is true that this case is 
the first time that the federal government has wholesale bought out a pipeline that has 
been approved by the National Energy Board (NEB), it is not the first time that the 
federal government has supported pipeline productions and been willing to back them up 
through large-scale financial means. In fact, this thesis will contend that the Canadian 
federal government has been financially and through regulatory means supporting all 
large-scale pipeline projects throughout most of Canada’s history. The federal 
government’s financial and regulatory support of pipelines is explained using the concept 
of indemnification, which is defined in this paper as a government entity taking 
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responsibility for the large-scale liabilities faced by an industry sector as a whole to 
ensure its continued survival as an industry despite any ongoing financial, regulatory and 
environmental issues in the sector that may make it seem non-viable within a jurisdiction 
or country. Indemnification therefore serves as a safety net for the industry sector being 
supported by having the government provide regulatory, financial and policy related help, 
regardless of the outcome of specific companies or projects for the benefit of the sector as 
a whole over time.  
While literature in Canada in recent years has increasingly focused on pipeline 
projects, often research has been restricted to a particular project or government policy. 
The literature review will show that despite increasing interest by scholars in pipeline 
projects and infrastructure, research focusing on individual projects or environmental 
consequences of oil infrastructure does not look at systematic patterns in government 
policy and why they have continued over time. Instead by focusing on industry supply-
side structure rather than just government policy or downstream effects, a better 
understanding of why and how the oil pipeline sector exists the way it does today can be 
determined. A small industry size, large firm size, high profit and market concentration 
by companies within an industry and a project that takes place in a concentrated 
geographical area can positively correlate to positive lobbying efforts and more 
government support of a particular industry. By looking at three cases, the Trans-Canada 
pipeline project of the 1950’s, the Sarnia to Montreal pipeline in the 1970’s (Line 9) and 
the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion project in our current day, this thesis will show 
how Canada’s federal government has enacted a long running policy of indemnifying the 
pipeline industry. Using these three case studies, the paper will conduct an in-depth 
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analysis of an ongoing public policy that uses process tracing to examine the history of 
this public policy from the 1950’s to present day regardless of changing corporate actors, 
political actors, differing political parties. As can be seen in Table 1.1, although some 
parameters do not fit exactly within the ideal, Salamon and Siegfried’s explanatory 
framework for how specific industries gain the benefit and support of government’s 
broadly matches the structure of the pipeline industry in Canada. While the industry 
sector model does not match up perfectly to all conditions for all of the case-studies the 
majority of indices matching up to show a higher probability of government support, 
some more (firm size, market concentration) more than others (industry size). When 
looked at in this way, an explanation can come forward to show why the government 
continued to support the pipeline industry over such a long period of time.  
This type of government support continued over time despite the typically 
neoliberal view that corporations benefit from a separation from government policies to 
ensure that most efficient and profitable industries (Friedman 2013, 11). In doing so, the 
method of analysis used in this research can allow for greater understanding of how large-
scale pipelines continue to be built with support from the federal government despite 
resistance from environmental groups, members of the public, Indigenous groups and in 
some case often reluctance on the part of the political parties in power to provide such a 
significant level of support.   
In what follows, the introduction includes a literature explaining previous research 
on pipelines in Canada, indemnification, and government incentives. Next I will show 
and explain the theory to be used in the thesis. As well, a justification for why industry 
structure and economic power explains government support of the pipeline industry in 
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comparison to other alternative theories. Also included within this chapter is the method 
in which the research was conducted. 
Table 1.1 Salamon and Siegfried’s applied industry structure compared to pipeline case 
studies 
Industry 
structure 
indicators  
Ideal 
structure 
for 
government 
support 
Trans Canada Line 9 Trans 
Mountain 
Industry Size 
(relative to 
general 
economy of 
Canada at that 
time) 
Small Small Medium Medium 
Firm Size Large Large Large Large 
Profit Rate High Low  High High  
Market 
Concentration 
High Highly 
concentrated 
Highly 
concentrated 
Highly 
concentrated 
Geographical 
Dispersion 
Concentrated Wide-ranging 
(across several 
provinces) 
Concentrated 
(two provinces) 
Concentrated 
(two provinces) 
 
1.1 Literature Review  
With the increase in controversial pipelines within Canada in the last few years, 
there has been a large increase in the amount of research available on not just the oil 
industry in Canada but also pipelines specifically. However, most pipeline research in 
Canada has been focused on the environmental or climate change impacts of pipelines 
(Gareau 2016; MacNeil and Paterson 2018; Carter 2018). Research has also been focused 
on mapping patterns of resistance to pipelines (Ilnyckyj 2017; Kilburn 1970). Veltmeyer 
and Bowles (2014) focus on extractive resistance to the Northern Gateway oil project 
arguing that the pipeline represents a form of neo-colonialism that sees Canada engaging 
in ‘extractivist imperialism’ against indigenous people. Research in this vein 
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concentrating on methods of resistance and impacts of pipelines focusing on indigenous 
people has been published on several pipelines such as those by Spice (2018) and 
Bradshaw (2015). Less scholarship can be found however on methods of support for 
pipeline construction. While studies looking at public support for pipeline development 
have occurred (Sherren et al 2019; McLean 2018), very little research has been conducted 
on direct government support for individual pipelines and why it exists. While scholars 
such as Walter (2019) have looked at if media coverage of oil pipelines affects 
government response, the focus on both Canadian and US cases does not examine 
financial policies on the part of the government in support of oil pipelines and instead 
focuses on the media’s influence when it comes to government support of pipelines. The 
study’s examination of pipelines on a case-by-case basis also extends only within the last 
ten years meaning that support cannot be traced under significantly different political, 
regulatory and economic conditions.  
A historical approach can be helpful when looking at policies to answer the 
question of why support occurs not just on an individual basis but also over a long period 
of time. Harold Innis was one of the first to do this when studying natural resources in 
Canada in his work The Fur Trade in Canada, in this work he examined the fur trade 
overtime from an economic, social, transportation and political manner (1999, 4). A more 
recent example can be seen in Bernauer’s examination on the mining and extractive 
industry in Nunavut and whether changes in the 1993 Nunavut Agreement facilitated 
changes overtime to present day to allow for greater Inuit control of natural resources 
(2019). Pierson and Skocpol note that taking a historical approach to political science 
questions can allow for the ability to address large substantive questions that are 
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“inherently of interest to broad publics as well as fellow scholars” (2003, 695). By taking 
time seriously they note that taking time seriously allows for the researcher to analyze 
macro contexts and hypothesize about the cumulative effect of processes and effects 
overtime, rather than just examine one phenomenon or process at one time (Ibid, 696). 
While this approach can be beneficial, it does create a large amount of data to examine 
which can generate a variety of explanation to explain the phenomenon being studied. For 
this reason, it is important to be specific about the type of occurrence and time being 
studied to ensure that the reasoning behind the conclusions of the researcher is clear.   
Work on government support has examined the National Energy Board and 
government subsidies of the oil and gas industry over various period of time in Canadian 
history. Analysis has occurred on the assessment process for oil and gas pipelines (Van 
Hinte et al 2007), which while useful does not speak to government support for the 
pipeline industry overall, as it is focused mainly on indirect government support through 
National Energy Board procedures. As this thesis makes the argument that the federal 
government does not just support the pipeline industry indirectly through regulatory 
mechanisms, but directly using explicit financial support showcases a gap in the 
literature.  
Investigation on the part of researchers has looked into a variety of methods of 
government support for the oil and gas industry. Sawyer and Stiebert (2010) looked at 
government support and subsidies to the oil sector at the time of publishing. They provide 
a very helpful overview of equity investment on the part of the federal government and 
how its ownership stake in projects such as the Canada Hibernia Holding Company 
reduces that risk exposure of oil companies in the event that they do not make a profit 
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(Sawyer and Stiebert 2010, 107). The authors looked at subsidies on both a federal and 
provincial level and did not separate out pipeline subsidies from the larger oil industry. 
Furthermore, since the study is based on a single year, conclusions about the rationale for 
long-term subsidies are not examined and large subsidy events such as one-time 
indemnification financial payments to pipeline projects are not discussed. Similarly, work 
conducted by Charles and Wooders (2011) and Merrill et al (2017) look at subsidies of 
governments in the oil and gas industry but focus on conventional oil subsidies in 
comparison with other sustainable energy resources. While these studies are helpful in 
looking at the overall scope of government support for this industry, analysis of specific 
instances of government indemnification in a definitive part of the oil and gas industry 
analysis can lead to study not just of subsidies that exist but the conditions that help 
precipitate them and would contribute to existing literature that currently exists 
examining government subsidies to this industry.    
Hoberg’s (2013) work looking at political risk analysis for governments approving 
modern pipeline proposals can provide an important primer to influences that can affect 
government support for pipeline projects. While the paper’s focus on how institutional 
veto points and the geographical distribution of risks and benefits can be helpful when 
looking at government support, the paper is focused on government approval of pipelines, 
not direct support of pipelines by government entities. Instead, Hoberg’s (2013) paper 
focuses more on the relative balance of pro- and anti-pipeline groups in different 
jurisdictions and how a number of criteria can change the political risk involved in 
approving pipeline projects. The paper also focuses on pipeline projects that at the time of 
publication where not approved by the National Energy Board or the federal government 
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and does not talk about examples of government risk when looking at past pipeline 
projects. For this reason, while it outlines many of the influences that affect government 
support of pipeline projects, the paper’s focus on pipeline approvals leaves a gap 
regarding direct government support.   
In addition, while some research has been conducted on government mechanisms 
or financial instruments used to support pipeline expansion for individual pipelines, little 
research has traced this support over an extended period of time. While researchers such 
as Kilbourne (1970) and Thorburn (1959) have traced the policy case for the Trans 
Canada Pipeline, these projects did not connect the policy case for one pipeline to 
another. Similarly, most writing on Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s oil policies 
mentioning Line 9 are focused on federal provincial tensions (Hamilton and Kroning 
1975), or the National Energy Program a whole (McDougall 1982; Doern and Toner 
2019). As the Trans Mountain pipeline has only recently been approved for purchase little 
peer-reviewed scholarship exists focusing on this policy decision specifically.  
Much research has been conducted on the influence of business groups and 
industries on government policies. Work describing the manner in which firms influence 
government decision-making can be found not only within political science literature 
(Salamon and Siegried 1977) but also within economics (Becker 1983) and management 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994). While empirical studies into the relationship between 
industry structure and firm influence have yielded mixed results (Potters and Sloof 1996) 
many have found a positive correlation such as that by Salamon and Siegried (1977) who 
found a positive relationship between industry concentration and company influence, and 
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small companies. Other such as Macher et al (2011) have looked at the country, industrial 
and firm characteristics that support the influence that companies have on government 
policies. While this multi-level approach is helpful, such a broad overview can speak 
about firms in general but lacks the details that a study on an industry in only one country 
could bring. For this reason a specified industry specific study into how government 
support for pipeline projects (and by extension pipeline companies) can be explained 
overtime would fill a gap in the literature both in regards to fiscal support of Canadian 
pipeline projects and if industry structure can be an explanatory framework when looking 
at a company’s ability to influence government policy.  
1.2 Theory  
This thesis will show that the specific economic structure of the oil and gas 
pipeline industry enabled it to influence political action to the point in which Canada has 
had a more than 50-year history of indemnifying the industry. It is generally agreed upon 
that companies have the ability to influence governments in the countries in which they 
operate. However, tracing the characteristics and conditions for how and in what way 
influence on government policy occurs can be explained in many different ways. Olson 
(1965) noted that an increase in the number of firms in an industry might decrease the 
probability of individual members to secure the outcomes that are in the best interests of 
the industry. This he contended can lead to an increase in the free rider problem in which 
actors within an industry are less incentivized to work to influence government policy, 
leading to less lobbying and less favourable government policies in that industries favour. 
Furthermore, Olson (1965) and others (Wilson 1980; Harrison 2010) note that 
government policies that create concentrated benefits for specific industries will have 
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different political calculations for governments compared to spending programs that 
spread out costs to taxpayers much more broadly. With this in mind, it is key that a theory 
be used that provides an explanatory framework that has a reason for why government 
policies will benefit certain types of industries over others.  
The theory of this thesis is based on the article, Economic Power and Political 
Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy by Lester M. Salamon and 
John J. Siegfried (1977). This article posits that not all corporate sectors and businesses 
are the same and as such, those with different economic structures will have different 
reaches in terms of the political influence that they have (Ibid, 1028). Salamon and 
Siegfried’s study seeks to prove its hypothesis that changes in the economic structure 
affects corporate political power by looking at how these differences could account for 
differences in federal corporate income tax rates and state excise tax rates in the United 
States of America within the manufacturing and mining sectors. However, this hypothesis 
could presumably hold true when looking at explanations for how other types of 
companies and sectors of the economy can influence government actions in other ways in 
countries other than just the United States. Similar research can be seen in the work of 
Macher et al. which found that industries ability to affect government policies depends on 
industry characteristics such as the number of industry competitors, size and origin of 
companies (2011, 4). 
Salamon and Siegfried posit that there are five facets contained within the 
economic structure that can be predictive of the political influence it has. These facets are 
the firm size, industry size, market concentration (defined as the proportion of an 
industry’s sales or assets by its largest companies), profit rate and degree of geographical 
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dispersion. Salamon and Siegfried’s article argues that the larger the size of the company 
the greater incentive they have to participate in politics (Ibid, 1031). This is due to both 
the larger amount of resources a larger company has, but also what they have to gain 
through reputation, which can gain them more access to the political system (Ibid). 
Macher et al (2011) additionally puts forward three reasons why larger firms may be 
more successful. The first is scale due to the fixed costs involved in procuring 
government influence, the second posits that larger companies have more to offer 
governments through votes, income or post-governmental employment and third “if 
lobbying represents a pure private good with no free rider problems, larger firms are 
likely to engage in more intense influence-seeking activities because productivity efforts 
are likely to be higher.” (Ibid, 4). Pipelines in particular seem to be a good focus of 
government resources in that they allow for both direct extraction of resources and the 
creation of secondary industries such as refineries or manufacturing within a country, 
which if supported by the government would benefit from this specialized support.  
Industry size on the other hand, is found by Salamon and Siegfried to work in the 
opposite manner to that of company size. Larger industries are often less successful, as 
the increased number of actors advocating for the industry can lead to less incentive to act 
(with the hypothesis that someone else will in their stead). Market concentration can be 
both a predictor of profits with the higher the concentration in an industry typically the 
higher the profits, but it can also lead to less of a free rider phenomenon. This is because 
the incentive for companies with larger market concentrations is to be directly involved in 
influencing political decisions since they have more to lose should decisions not go in 
specific directions (Salamon and Siegfried 1977, 1032). Profit rate is a factor chosen not 
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just because highly profitable companies can be benefited or harmed by political 
decisions to a greater degree, and the ability they have to institute the resources needed to 
influence the political sphere. The paper does disprove its own hypothesis of companies 
with beneficial concentrated market structures and profitability being able to influence 
certain types of political decisions when it comes to attempts to influence tax structures 
(Ibid, 1040). However, the choices of particular firms to not lobby against certain tax 
increases could be seen as either a product of their ineffectiveness or a strategic choice on 
their part in light of larger industry conditions (Ibid, 1042). For this reason, they will still 
be tested to see if they can be seen as explanatory factors for government support of 
pipelines.  
Geographical dispersion is the final facet that is deemed to be important, with both 
companies and industries that are more geographically concentrated generally being more 
successful in influencing political decisions compared to those that are spread out over a 
wide area. This is primarily due to the way in which industries concentrated in areas have 
the ability to advocate not just on a federal level but can make large impacts on local 
representative members and the communities in which they are elected. Geographical 
dispersion is useful not only as a measure of potential influence companies can have but 
can also be seen as a metric of potential political risk. Pipelines could be an excellent 
example of this, as they often have the potential to be supported within geographically 
concentrated areas and depending on their size can physically impact multiple 
geographical regions which impacts a wider range of populations who could potentially 
be against expansion in a certain area, jeopardizing the entire length of the pipeline 
(Hoberg 2013). 
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The theory put forward by Salamon and Siegfried has been used extensively to 
study the relationship between corporate lobbying and tax strategies such as in the case of 
Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons (2009) and Riedel and Simmler (2018). It has also 
been used to study the connection between taxation and industry structure in the Canadian 
manufacturing industry (Blais and Vaillancourt 1988). Blais and Vaillancourt do show 
that certain determinants are significant when studied in the Canadian context, however 
their emphasis on tax policy as well as its dated nature make utilizing the theory over a 
wider time period and within a more specific industry helpful. Using the theory in this 
way could prove useful in explaining past government policy and as a framework to 
create policy moving forward.  
Salamon and Siegfried’s theory has also been used to explain how certain 
industries such as the chemical industry seek to avoid government regulations and 
sanctions (King and Lenox 2000) or how the steel industry lobby’s for trade protections 
(Schuler 1996). This theory was used to analyze electricity infrastructure development 
(Henisz and Zelner 2006) which while similar in that both the electricity and oil and gas 
pipeline sector involve large scale infrastructure projects, their industry structure can 
differ significantly. This is notable considering the study looked at 78 countries from 
1970-94. While both the scope and method of analysis in this study differs greatly from 
this thesis, it does show that this theory can be used both to analyze the resource sector as 
well as industries involved in large scale infrastructure projects that are often considered 
essential or in the national interest. Expanding the type of industry and time frame of 
study can help to pinpoint important indices of industry structure in a country context not 
as often studied using this theory as most analysis focuses on the United States. 
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The theory has also been used to analyze the oil crisis of the late 1970’s to 
examine the impact of public opinion and media attention can influence government 
action on regulatory threats towards the oil industry (Erfle, McMillan and Grofman 
1990). The study found that large, visible firms restrained increases in oil prices for the 
most important products when media coverage of the oil industry was extensive, but firms 
raised prices when the government was busy with other issues or there was external 
international rational for price increases (Ibid, 60). While Erfle et al’s paper focuses more 
on the role of regulatory threat as opposed to the power of firms, there are parallels that 
point towards why using the Salamon and Siegfried’s theory can be helpful when looking 
at other aspects of the oil and gas industry. Both pipelines and the price of oil have in 
some cases led to significant public opinion that in some case has led to different 
outcomes for more visible companies verses those that were not in the public eye. Using 
this method of analysis for oil and gas pipelines in Canada can help to explain constant 
policy actions on part of the government while contributing evidence in support of how 
industry structure can be predictive of its influence on government actions in another 
industry and over a significantly larger period of time.   
 There are a number of reasons that Salamon and Siegfried’s theory was chosen in 
comparison to other alternative theories. The theory recognizes the differing political 
power that exists not just between political and non-political actors, but also by actors 
within different sectors. Their conclusion that “larger firm size does indeed seem to yield 
greater political power” (Salamon and Siegfried 1977, 1033) recognizes the potential 
power within large concentrated industries and provides an explanation for why the 
Canadian government would go to such lengths to safeguard one particular industry. This 
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type of interest group model additionally recognizes that different groups will have 
differing levels of influence that can lead to policy outcomes favouring one group over 
the other. The recognition of economic power and how it can influence and be interlinked 
with state power is particularly important to many scholars (Nigam 1996, 7). The 
importance of economic powers and market forces has only increased with the continued 
capitalisation of society (Kujipers 2013, 15). Within this study the intertwining of 
economic and political power is key to note because despite neoliberal assertions of the 
need for separation between capital and the state this is not what occurs in practice 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004, 276). Instead corporations often see politics as a 
competition of interests in order to maximize profit to the amount they are able (Kuhner 
2007, 2365). Companies seeking indemnification are therefore in sharp contrast to the 
often-asserted neoliberal pro-market insistence against state interference in favour of 
deregulation, marketization and privitization (Peck 2001). This theory provides an 
explanatory framework as to how the oil and gas pipeline industry in particular was able 
to secure such high level of government support across party lines.  
The theory used can be contrasted with other theories that could possibly be used 
such as the Staples Trap (Innis 1999). While Stapes Theory provides a good explanation 
of Canada’s reliance overall on the oil industry in particular is more difficult to fit into 
just the pipeline sector of oil and gas. This is both due to the fact that some scholars have 
suggested that Canada has reduced its staples bias in the time since World War II 
(Stanford 2008, 8) in contrast to the government’s steady support of the pipeline sector. 
Additionally, the more nationalist attempts by the Trudeau government in the 1970’s 
stand in contrast to the emphasis on international export evident put forward to support 
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the Trans Mountain in the present day, as do the amounts of foreign direct investment 
present during the time period studied that are so important to staples theorists (Haley 
2011, 10). While it may be true that Canada is uniquely dependent on resource extraction 
and export and staples theory can provide an explanation for Canada’s reliance on 
extractive industries (Fast 2014, 33), it is less helpful in explaining the direct mechanisms 
that led to such wide-scale indemnification of the pipeline industry. Using an argument 
based on the difference between industry sectors allows for recognition of the differences 
between different resource industries and the way in which this then affects the oil and 
gas pipeline industry. 
The use of Salamon and Siegfried’s (1977) theory provides a reason for why 
government policies will benefit certain types of industries over others. The different 
industry structures of different sectors will impact their ability to gain government 
support. The five facets outlined by Salamon and Siegfried (firm size, industry size, 
market concentration, profit rate and degree of geographical dispersion) have been 
studied in the context of corporate lobbying and tax strategies, manufacturing and how 
certain industries seek to avoid government regulations and sanctions (King and Lenox, 
2000). While it has been used when looking at the influence of government action on 
regulatory threats toward the oil industry (Erfle, McMilland and Grofman 1990) it has not 
been used in the context of pipeline research before. The theory was chosen because it has 
the ability to showcase power between political and non-political actors and actors within 
different sectors and provides an explanatory theory for government support in a small 
concentrated industry such as the oil and gas pipeline sector. As can be seen within the 
three case studies chosen, the Trans Canada, Line 9 and Trans Mountain pipelines 
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provide an example of how a smaller industry size, large firm size and highly 
concentrated pipeline industry at the time helped the companies overseeing pipeline 
construction at each time to secure government support for their projects. Although the 
geographical dispersion for the Trans Canada was wide-ranging instead of concentrating 
and their profit rate was low this can be mostly explained by the conditions of the 
industry in the 1950’s in which almost no pipeline industry had a large profit rate. This 
thesis will in the forthcoming chapters will explore in more detail how a theory such as 
Salamon and Siegfried’s (1977) can explain the Canadian federal government’s level of 
support for the oil and gas pipeline industry in each case study.      
1.3 Method 
This study uses a qualitative case-based method to test its hypothesis. A combination of 
cross-case comparisons and within-case analysis was used to first prove that cases both 
represented instances of indemnification and that causal factors could fit into the wider 
theory of how the policy continued overtime1. This was done through process tracing as 
when studying historical instances, it can be particularly helpful in finding similarities 
through multiple cases (George et al 2005, 203). In the words of Jack Goldstone,  
To identify the process, one must … figure out which aspects of the initial 
conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that 
may be at work, would have combined to generate the observed sequence of 
events (1991, 50).  
 
1 Alternatively, this was also where if causal factors within a case study did not fit the 
larger narrative, analysis was done as to why this may have occurred.  
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This thesis seeks to do just that and highlight first cases of government direct fiscal 
support of pipelines as well as what conditions are common for the cases studied. The 
following section will explain the rationale for taking a case study approach, case study 
selection, as well as how and with what materials research was conducted.  
While Salamon and Siegfried (1977) set out to prove their hypothesis using cross-
sectional data and regression techniques, the use of case studies to test this theory in the 
case of the study of pipelines in Canada was chosen instead for a few reasons. Salamon 
and Siegfried note that case study material can provide critical insights that can form the 
bedrock for future hypothesis that can then be tested on a more empirical level (1977, 
1028). The use of a case study approach that focuses not just pipelines approved within 
Canada, but instead is focused on instances in which pipelines in Canada have been 
fiscally indemnified by the Canadian government. This approach was taken because while 
the paper argues that the act of indemnification by a government provides cover for oil 
and gas pipeline companies to develop all pipeline projects whether they experience 
issues or not, this is hard to quantify from a research perspective.2 The amount of 
pipelines present in Canada is relatively small compared to other countries and therefore 
the instances of pipelines gaining fiscal government support are also infrequent. Harding 
et al., note that using quantitative methods when studying rare events can make it difficult 
to gather data on a sample of events leading to further issues when trying to determine 
commonalities, differences and causal factors (2002, 176). Instead they state that using a 
 
2 This may be an avenue for future research as alternative methods of research such as 
interviews with government and business officials on pipelines not supported financially. 
While this may be a current limitation of this study given time and length constraints it 
was not feasible within the scope of this project. 
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qualitative case study approach can be helpful for political scientists and political 
sociologists. Additionally, given that some uncontroversial pipelines were approved in 
many cases without elected officials or businesses speaking extensively in public on the 
issue, it provides less publicly available evidence for how indemnification is taking place. 
Instead, by focusing on controversial pipelines that were nonetheless supported by the 
government, evidence can be seen of how indemnification of the whole industry works. 
By using case studies, the case for how and why the federal government indemnifies the 
Canadian pipeline industry can be made across factors such as government in power, time 
and surrounding economic circumstances.  
While studying all pipelines might provide better evidence to support this thesis, 
given the scope, length of study and need for detailed analysis of each case study it is not 
feasible to do the study on this level. Nonetheless, despite not using an empirical 
approach, this thesis will still seek to test the theories brought forward by Salamon and 
Siegfried on a case by case basis to determine if they can help explain the indemnification 
of the oil and gas pipeline industry. By using the five criteria of measurement put forward 
(firm size, industry size, market concentration, profit rate and degree of geographical 
dispersion) comparisons can be made based on the individual case studies presented. 
Additionally, conclusions can be reached about whether these indices are predictors of 
government indemnification of the oil and gas pipeline industry overtime.  
These three case studies were chosen due to a number of factors. An inductive 
approach was used to find case studies that spanned a period of time, displayed 
indemnification actions by the federal government and pipelines that experienced some 
difficulty in their implementation. This could then lead to questions regarding why the 
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federal government would support pipelines through these challenges. While the first 
pipeline was built in Canada in the 1860’s until nearly a century later in the 1950’s only 
three major pipeline routes were built. These projects were of a much smaller scale than 
those built after the 1950’s and the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in Alberta. 
The discovery of oil at the Leduc No. 1 oil field in the late 1940’s heralded the modern 
pipeline industry and the time in which oil became a much larger industry in the Canadian 
economy. It is this period of time from 1950 to present day that this thesis will focus on 
as before World War II the oil and gas pipeline industry differed drastically from todays.  
The first case studied within this thesis focuses on the building of the Trans 
Canada pipeline in the 1950’s. It represents one of the first large actions on the part of the 
federal government to build a large segment of pipeline with public funds when the 
financial ability of the company building it (Trans-Canada Pipelines Ltd) seemed near 
collapse (Bothwell and Kilbourn 1979, 295). The $115 million dollars pledged 
represented a large controversy at the time for the ruling Liberal government, who despite 
being painted as supporting US oil tycoons over Canadian interests continued to push for 
government support of the pipeline. The second case chosen looks at the expansion of the 
Interprovincial Pipe Line from Sarnia to Montreal (also called Line 9) in the mid-1970’s. 
This expansion showcases significant federal government support in the amount of almost 
$250 million for the pipeline despite changing international oil markets and differing 
government objective from those expounded in the 1950’s.  
While many recent pipeline projects have been proposed in recent years, they 
were not suitable as a third case study for a variety of reasons. The Mackenzie Gas 
project was not chosen as the company building the pipeline (Imperial Oil) with drew 
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plans for the pipeline on the grounds that it was not fiscally feasible given the demand for 
oil both in the 1970’s and throughout the 2010’s when the plan was revived. The 
Keystone XL (TransCanada) was rejected by the Obama administration in 2015 and then 
subsequently approved by President Trump when he came into office. Similarly, 
Enbridge’s Line 3 Replacement Project has been largely completed in Canada and faced 
its significant delays in on the US side. As these pipelines faced delays due to issues on 
the US side on issues outside of the Canadian governments control, they do not provide a 
good opportunity to study how the Canadian government indemnifies pipelines. In 
contrast, Northern Gateway (Enbridge) was a solely within Canada pipeline proposal 
similar to Trans Mountain. Both served as a gateway for land locked oil in Alberta to 
Canada’s west coast through BC in order to access international oil markets. However, 
given capacity concerns, the controversial nature of Northern Gateway and the Federal 
Court’s overturning of the previous government’s approval of the project because Ottawa 
had not adequately consulted First Nations along the project’s route (The Canadian Press 
2018). The Energy East pipeline, which sought to bring Alberta oil to the east coast of 
Canada for export, is an infrastructure project that when abandoned can be argued to put 
more pressure on the federal government to ensure the industry as a whole had access to 
international markets leading to the support of the expansion of the Trans Mountain 
pipeline.  For these reasons Trans Mountain was chosen as the third case study as it 
showcases the way in which the federal government indemnifies the oil and gas pipeline 
industry (but not necessarily every project proposed). The federal government’s decision 
to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline for $4.5 billion represents the largest monetary 
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amount on the part of the federal government despite significant public protest on the part 
of some parties.  
These case studies were analyzed through the use of government, media and other 
types of document analysis, historical analysis of the time as well as other secondary 
sources such as academic articles. This method was chosen to ensure consistency of 
analysis across the large time span of the three case studies selected. While methods such 
as interviews were considered given that those involved in the Trans Mountain pipeline 
may be unable to disclose information on an ongoing project, and those involved in the 
Trans-Canada pipeline in the 1950’s might not be alive.  
Data was collected using both primary and secondary sources. Particular interest 
was focused on newspaper articles, NEB reports, press releases and communications 
materials of oil and gas pipeline companies and government documents. Newspaper 
articles were gathered using the aggregate news databases Factiva, the Toronto Star 
historical archive and modern Canadian internet newspaper sites. Documents were 
gathered from the Glenbow Archives, Library and Archives Canada and internet archives. 
Additionally, non-governmental organizations and think tank reports were consulted as 
well as academic articles.  
1.4 Conclusion 
Barry Ritholz in his book Bailout Nation writes “any system that allows profits to be kept 
by a select few but expects the loss to be borne by the public is neither capitalism nor 
socialism: It is the worst of both worlds.” (2009, 4) This thesis will seek to argue that 
Canada’s system of indemnifying oil and gas pipeline companies represents the worst of 
both worlds. The Canadian government (and by extension its citizens) hold all of the risk 
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of losses while oil and gas corporations only stand to gain the profits. By looking at these 
three case studies spanning from the 1950’s to present day, the federal government’s 
long-term policy of indemnifying the oil and gas pipeline industry can be seen. Analyzing 
these cases through an explanatory framework of industry structure can seek to provide 
causal explanations for why an indemnification project has persisted in Canada. It can 
also question if this is a policy that should continue in the future or if alternatives should 
be considered in its place.   
Following the introductory chapter, a chapter on indemnification follows. This 
chapter outlines the definition of indemnification, indemnification in a business and 
government context, as well as how the term is used within this research. The next three 
chapters individually examine each case study chosen. They provide historical analysis 
for how government actors overtly acted to indemnify specific pipeline projects as well as 
examine the industry structure and actors of the oil and gas pipeline industry to show how 
this created the continued conditions for a policy of indemnification by the federal 
government. This is followed by a conclusion that questions the current state of 
indemnification of the oil and gas industry by the federal government and discusses the 
long-term costs of this policy beyond the initial money offered by the government.  
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Indemnification  
Indemnification clauses are used by businesses, organizations, and governments to 
protect against losses should the specifications within contracts fail to come to pass. They 
can serve as a sort of stopgap, preventing specific parties from being held liable for their 
own actions in the event of mistakes or contract issues (Johnston 1978, 1993). 
Traditionally indemnification clauses are discussed within business circles to describe 
specific prescribed formal proceedings overseen by signed contracts and lawyers. While 
this thesis is not arguing that the Canadian federal government has signed formal 
agreements agreeing to indemnify the oil and gas pipeline projects and companies, it is 
arguing that the government’s actions regarding pipeline projects in Canada have 
essentially functioned as if they were the indemnitor for the industry. Governments have 
supported a variety of industries either directly or indirectly throughout Canadian history 
(Klein and Le Roy 2010, 237). Because government policies supporting the pipeline 
industry has occurred systematically over a long period of time, business and industry 
professionals can use their knowledge of the federal government’s willingness to 
indemnify the industry as a type of risk management calculation that can be counted on in 
the event that their project encounters significant problems. In this way, although 
indemnification is traditionally thought of as a clear and equal apolitical partnership 
between two parties, when looking at indemnification as a concept and examining the oil 
and gas pipeline industry, the Canadian government seems to have agreed to support the 
industry without thought to the costs in the future. This then leads to power imbalances 
when issues with pipelines arise, often leading to the federal government drafting policies 
that cater not just to the industry but to specific pipeline projects.  
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Before going into greater detail regarding this however, it is important to define 
the difference between what would be termed as government support (or subsidy) and 
what this paper is calling government indemnification of an industry. Without this 
distinction it would be easy to say that the government indemnifies all industries, thus 
making the term overly broad. Indemnification in this thesis will be defined as the 
government taking responsibility for the large-scale liabilities faced by the industry to 
ensure its continued survival despite the fact that it has encountered significant ongoing 
issues. Action by the government is therefore taken not just to support a part of a project 
or company within a sector (often known as a subsidy), but the whole sector itself. 
Indemnification under this definition is also different from so-called government bailouts. 
Bailouts can be defined as financial help to an entity that would otherwise be on the edge 
of failure or bankruptcy most likely as a result of immediate emergency measures (Block 
2010, 160). While indemnification of an industry can lead to bailouts of specific projects 
or sectors, it also serves as a guarantee regardless of the outcome of the project, thus 
differentiating the two. Additionally, while sectors can lobby for government bailouts, 
they usually occur infrequently and are lobbied for without the expectation of continued 
ongoing support of the sector. In using this definition, the chapter will also argue that the 
indemnification relationship between government and industry is not one of equals, but 
instead one in which the oil industry holds significantly more power. This will be 
examined by first discussing what indemnification is, indemnification in the oil and gas 
industry, the manner in which the Canadian government acts as an indemnitor in a variety 
of sectors. The chapter will then discuss how this thesis will define indemnification to be 
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used in relation to the three case studies chosen relating to the Canadian oil and gas 
pipeline industry.  
2.1 Broad Definition 
An indemnity is defined by David Newsome Jr as an action that takes place when 
a party agrees to cover another party’s losses to a third party (2012, 42). A simpler way to 
state this is that indemnification clauses are “the primary place in the contract where the 
parties hash out who will bear the risk if something goes wrong” or the promise by one 
entity to take on the other entity’s risk in the event of future damages (Izzo 2013,76). In 
this way, a common indemnification agreement place’s the responsibility of loss or 
damage on the party who controls the work (Newsome 2012, 42). Indemnification is 
therefore a technique or tool used to minimize the risks of a project by making another 
organization responsible for those calculated risks within the project that they are in 
charge of or contracted to complete (Voigtmann and Clifford 2018, 10). A common 
example of the use of an indemnification clause is within the construction industry and 
can help visualize what indemnification means in a non-abstract manner. Say for example 
that a contractor signs a contract with a homeowner to redo their house. It is a large 
project and so to ensure people with specialized knowledge, the contractor gets a different 
company to build the roof of the house, making a roof building company a subcontractor 
within the project. An indemnification clause signed between the contractor and 
subcontractor would ensure for example that a subcontractor working on a homeowner’s 
property would not hold the owner or contractor responsible for damages that may result 
because of the subcontractor’s inability to complete the tasks outlined within the contracts 
signed by all parties involved in construction. In plainer language, if a subcontractor is 
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contracted to replace a roof and as a result of the poor work of the subcontractor the roof 
leaks, theoretically the homeowner and the original contracted company would not be 
responsible for the cost of fixing the roof and any damages caused to the home due to the 
leaking roof because they have the protection of an indemnification agreement. Instead, 
the costs associated with the failure to complete the contract as stated would fall to the 
subcontractor. By signing agreements such as this, the risk that the contracting company 
would have to pay the homeowner if mistakes are made decreases significantly and for 
this reason they are used frequently for many types of business and construction type 
agreements. This is a simple example of an indemnification agreement, but these types of 
agreements can become much more complex depending on a number of factors that will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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Table 2.1 Types of Indemnification agreements and United States (US) and Canadian 
government regulations surrounding these types of agreements 
Type of 
Indemnification 
Agreement 
Fault-based Agreements Knock-for 
Knock 
Limited Intermediate Broad 
Damage 
covered 
Only covers 
damage 
caused 
directly by 
indemnitor 
Indemnitor 
responsible for 
own negligence 
and the partial 
negligence of 
other parties 
Indemnitor 
assumes entire 
risk for issues, 
damages or 
loss on a 
project 
Both parties 
agree to take 
complete 
responsibility 
for injury or 
damage claims 
on projects 
Government 
regulations on 
agreements 
Most 
agreements 
valid in 
Canada and 
US 
Most 
agreements 
valid in Canada 
and US 
Not prohibited 
under 
Canadian 
regulations but 
not valid by 
most states in 
US 
Barred in 
certain US 
states 
(Louisiana) but 
have been 
upheld in 
Canadian courts 
Industries 
indemnification 
type found in 
Employee use 
cases, rental 
car 
companies 
Rental property 
companies, 
construction, 
manufacturing 
Infrastructure 
and 
construction 
projects 
Oil and gas 
 
Critically, it is key to note that just because one party is responsible for negligence, it 
does not guarantee that they will not be held financially responsible under 
indemnification agreements (Kangles et al. 2011, 341). Who is held responsible will 
depend on the type of indemnification agreement parties have agreed to. While there are 
many different types of indemnification agreements, they generally fall into three broad 
categories. These categories are limited, intermediate and broad and can be seen in Table 
2.1. A limited indemnity clause only covers damages for the indemnitee that are directly 
the fault of the indemnitor (Newsome 2012, 43). On the other hand, intermediate 
indemnity makes the indemnitor answerable for their own negligence as well as the 
partial negligence of the indemnitee (creating more protection for this party) (Ibid). Broad 
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indemnification goes to a more extreme level of coverage for the indemnitee. In this type 
of indemnity, the indemnitor assumes the entire risk of issues/damages/loss surrounding 
the project (Ibid). This means that the indemnitor must cover losses including those that 
are singularly caused by the fault of the indemnitee. Despite these different types of 
indemnification, it is key to note that governments in specific states and provinces do 
regulate the type of indemnification clauses that can be implemented between parties 
(Ibid, 44). These regulations are often put in place to ensure that larger companies that 
subcontract work cannot simply push all risk for projects onto subcontractors despite their 
own neglect (Ibid, 45). Regulations such as these are particularly prevalent within the 
United States, where in most states broad indemnification agreements are not seen as 
valid by most courts (Ibid). In Canada however, broad-type indemnification clauses are 
not prohibited by any type of legislation, leading to greater risk for certain parties that 
enter into this type of contract (Rylands 2015, 10).   
It is notable that indemnification is largely about risk management on the part of 
one party within the contract when examined within business and legal scholarship 
circles. By identifying, analyzing and through clauses minimizing risks (commonly 
through transfer of risk to make other parties responsible for said risk) any company that 
uses these clauses stands to gain from the success of a venture while also minimizing 
their potential liabilities (Newsome 2012, 43). It has been argued by those who write 
about indemnification in legal scholarship that indemnification agreements can create 
mutually beneficial conditions in which the purchase redundant insurance coverage can 
be avoided and there is a decreased litigation that occurs as a result of both parties 
understanding their respective risk exposure (Kangles et al. 2011, 347). Under optimal 
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conditions, the type of indemnification clause chosen in an agreement is described as 
having the ability to create a fair allocation of risks between both entities. This is done so 
risks are held by the party best able to alleviate or prevent the risks from occurring (Izzo, 
2013, 76). For example, a subcontractor for the roof would be responsible for liabilities 
related to the roof but would bear no responsibility for issues related to other areas of a 
home such as the foundation. While this type of indemnification may represent the ideal, 
it is however not always the reality. In fact, it is more likely that allocation of risks 
present in indemnification agreements often reflect the relative bargaining power of the 
entities within the agreement rather than an impartial designation of risks due to the roles 
of the parties within a project (Ibid). This is often simply because the party with more 
leveraging power (often the bigger entity or general contractor for a project) has the 
ability to seek new parties in the event that the weaker party does not agree to conditions 
they have set out (Newsome 2012, 45). If the weaker party refuses the conditions set out, 
they risk losing out on a job and then have no role in the project going forward. While 
this is acknowledged as something that can occur within legal literature, the underlying 
policy, regulatory and political consequences of this type of system is rarely discussed 
within literature discussing indemnification agreements.  
Within the business world, indemnification clauses are often dealt with by the 
indemnitor by taking out insurance policies, as the assumed risk of potentially paying for 
catastrophic issues related to the project could cripple them (Ibid, 44). In fact, regardless 
of the type of indemnity clause included in the contract, all parties involved with the 
project (in the case of our example the contractor, subcontractor and homeowner) would 
all take out insurance to ensure that should any issues occur on a project would be 
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covered as much as possible despite the indemnification clause and might be required 
within any contract to do so by government regulations (Izzo 2013, 77). This ensures that 
the parties assuming liability in the project have the ability to cover that liability in the 
event of a needed payout. Without these assurances, companies could agree to take on 
large amounts of risk and then fail to pay in the event of their need to be activated. When 
looking at indemnification as a concept between the pipeline industry and the government 
however, the federal government often acts not just as the indemnifying party but also as 
its own insurance company. This can cause the government to pay out of its own 
consolidated revenue fund or take on debt to support specific pipeline projects. Therefore 
while both insurance and indemnification clauses serve as a way of allocating risk 
associated with a project for the parties involved, the amount of risk each party takes on 
and the consequences of those risks can have larger consequences from a political 
perspective for governments than companies (Mercier, Kane, and Nammour 2015, 266). 
This action calls into question whether “risk management” on the part of parties are not 
simply dry mathematical calculations as they are often portrayed but instead are actions 
of power made between often unequal parties. This is exactly what a political economy 
approach to indemnification literature can bring to scholarship in contrast to business and 
legal scholarship which many times focuses on working within the existing structures 
rather than examining or questioning the structures themselves. The ways that these 
indemnification clauses are constructed and used can vary from industry to industry, and 
consequently given the topic of this essay it is useful to understand how the oil and gas 
industry has generally utilized indemnification clauses to show how what we are calling 
indemnification differs from what is standard in the industry. This will enable further 
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comparison between their formal use and the informal manner they are currently being 
used within the oil and gas pipeline industry.  
2.2 Indemnification in the Oil and Gas Industry 
Indemnification agreements/clauses have been used within the oil and gas industry 
for quite some time. They are most often present within the specific contracting of a 
project between two entities, be it for the building a single oil well, or within the context 
of a large project financed LNG or pipeline venture (Rylands 2015, 10). Most often 
indemnification agreements in this sector occur between those that explore and produce 
oil and gas (known as the Operators) and companies that provide services to support and 
facilitate exploration and development activities (known as the Contactors) (Mercier, 
Kane, and Nammour 2015, 246). 
The oil and gas sector is generally characterized as an expensive, risky, initially 
capital-intensive industry, often indemnification agreements are used to reduce risk and 
litigation costs in the event damages are incurred (Evans and Butler 2010, 226). In this 
way, indemnification agreements have been proposed as a tool to encourage compromise 
and alliance between parties involved within a project and as a tool to ensure that all 
parties acquire adequate insurance coverage for oil and gas projects (Talbit and Piziak 
2013, 6). Additionally, in the event of claims that occur outside of those involved in the 
project, an indemnification clause provides a way forward for parties involved to defend 
themselves against those potential future claims (Ibid, 8).  
This can particularly be seen in the popularity of reciprocal indemnification 
agreements within the industry. These so called ‘knock for knock’ agreements, as seen in 
Table 2.1, ensure that because both parties agree to take complete responsibility for all 
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injury and damage claims made by its employees no matter which party was at fault the 
relationship between parties working together can focus on the overall safety of 
employees rather than the liability in the event of injury (Evans and Butler 2010, 227). 
These agreements also reduce litigation costs, as there is less incentive for either party to 
go to court and have the potential to create intangible benefits for companies such as 
better cooperation and the ability to present a united front in the event of issues that 
develop with parties outside of the reciprocal indemnification agreement (Ibid, 229). 
Knock for knocks are however not a guarantee of decided liability, and have been struck 
down as in the case of the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, which while allowing 
for reciprocal indemnity agreements to do with property damage, makes illegal 
agreements involving the death or bodily injury of persons (Ibid, 230). In many cases 
within the United States indemnification for an indemnitee’s own negligence is barred 
under legislation such as the Louisiana example previously discussed (Kangles, Rogers 
and Harris 2011, 342). Litigation regarding knock for knock indemnification can also be 
seen in the Canadian context, but with opposing results. In one particular example the 
Alberta Courts in Precision Drilling Canada Limited Partnership v Yangarra Resources, 
2015 ABQB 433 upheld a knock-for-knock agreement leading to millions of dollars for 
the operator despite them not being directly at fault (Rylands 2015, 9). The wording of 
this agreement had that required the cost of repairing or redrilling a lost or damaged well 
regardless of the fault of contractor’s negligence or fault. This then led to one party 
bearing the cost of the negligence despite the fact that it was the fault of the other party 
(Ibid). Thus the wording of these contracts can be of great importance in the event of 
liability issues, as initially small mistakes in oil and gas development can result in 
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significant cost burdens regardless of the use of knock for knock agreements to prevent 
such occurrences.   
While knock for knock agreements are present within the industry, most of the oil 
and gas industry internationally and within Canada is governed by standard form 
contracts that include a variety indemnification options for parties to agree to (Mercier, 
Kane and Nammour 2014, 247). In Canada the most common types of indemnification 
agreements are knock for knock, fault-based regimes and hybrids of these two types of 
agreements for different components of a single project (Ibid, 251). Fault-based regimes 
simply agree that under specific terms one party will indemnify the other party based on 
who is in error and have been described above and can be seen in Table 2.1. Companies 
also at times use pre-written standard agreements are often called master services 
agreements or MSAs when drafting indemnification contracts of all types. These standard 
contracts are most often used to save parties time and transaction costs. They also 
theoretically ensure that all parties are familiar with the language of the contract (Rylands 
2015, 9).  
Whether utilizing any of the three systems described above, the Canadian courts 
have upheld the view that under the Canadian common law system liability has 
historically and still is currently allocated based on causation and fault. Because of this, 
most commercial agreements are drafted with these principles in mind (Kangles et al. 
2011, 355). Therefore, courts often see indemnification agreements in this light as with 
the Precision v Yangarra case, in which the court noted that both parties were 
sophisticated commercial entities with equal bargaining power to fully understand a 
contract based on allocation of risks in the event of fault. In doing so, the court therefore 
 36 
upheld not just the knock-for knock agreement but stated that such standard type 
agreements should be allowed to continue and do not present a public policy problem in 
which negligence is encouraged (Rylands 2015, 10). They did however state that, “the 
indemnity clause would only be unenforceable in circumstances in which intentional 
harm was inflicted.” (Ibid 15) Despite the presence of some case law on indemnification 
agreements in Canada, due to the number of MSAs that exist there are very few cases to 
point out potential pitfalls or court opinions on these agreements (Mercier, Kane, and 
Nammour 2015, 278). This is primarily thought be because of the high cost of court 
litigation, which presents a deterrent towards bringing disagreements to court. Instead 
disagreements about the interpretation of indemnification agreements are instead solved 
through commercial solutions (Ibid).    
The use of MSAs often are used as a starting point between parties, with the 
understanding that modifications will be made to address special circumstances and 
atypical environmental issues that may occur (Ibid). It is notable that contracts do not 
have to be standard and can also occur between the parties themselves or also be 
negotiated by parties such as the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors 
and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers on behalf of groups looking to 
enter into an agreement (Ibid). While these industry groups have pushed for industry or 
country standard forms, forms created today are instead commonly used as a type of 
reference tool for more specific agreements (Mercier, Kane, and Nammour 2015, 247). 
Additionally, within the standard energy industry it is rare to find contracts that allocate 
risk based solely on a fault basis (Kangles et al. 2011, 359). This is most likely due to the 
high risk associated with many oil and gas related projects as determined by the 
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proponents of these oil and gas projects (Ibid). Instead contracts can utilize a fault-based 
and no-fault based liability agreements or allow for different liabilities to be faced by 
different parties to the contract (often called multiple fault regimes) in order to incentivize 
contracted parties to take on the construction or operation of high-risk projects (Ibid). In 
this way, oil and gas companies using indemnification agreements as a type of risk 
management to ensure their ongoing financial viability in the future. These contracts are 
often very complex, with different liability and indemnification agreements created for 
each portion of the project and potential liabilities they may face (ex. asset risks, 
environmental damages, breach of contract etc.). The contracts may also specify the limit 
of liability that a particular party can be held responsible for (Ibid, 362). Due to these 
common practices, oil and gas companies that exist today are very familiar with 
indemnification agreements and how they can be used to ensure that liability is not held 
solely by the company.  
2.3 The Canadian Government and Indemnification 
Governments regularly indemnify specific risks present within their countries, 
including risks related to natural disasters (floods), nuclear power accidents and terrorism 
coverage. A justification for indemnification of these and other industries is that the risks 
involved in these areas have the potential for calamitous losses that would cause 
insurance agents to become insolvent or create conditions in which insurance premiums 
would be so expensive as to disincentivize those that need it the most (Brennan, Kousky, 
and Macauley 2010, 119). An example of this type of government program is flood 
insurance programs in certain areas of the United States. Other justifications for 
government indemnification include viewing the move to indemnify on the part of 
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governments as a tacit subsidy to encourage the continued positive externalities 
propagated by the industry or project (Lakdawalla and Zanjani 2005, 1893). One such 
example of this is a government’s support of space programs, which are highly risky 
endeavours that could likely not go forward without both a governments guarantees and 
funding commitments. This type of indemnification by the federal government can be 
characterized as a type of indemnifier of last result for the common good. In these cases, 
the government consciously enters into agreements with industries to indemnify them in 
the event of catastrophic or unforeseen events. The government’s support of the pipeline 
industry is not classified as this type of agreement because it is not formalized in this 
manner and not agreed to beforehand that it is in the public good for the government to 
support a particular industry. Instead, indemnification of pipelines in Canada, while a 
continuous pattern overtime, is informal in nature and examined on a case by case basis 
by governments despite the fact that this piecemeal approach when looked at by the 
industry is seen as a sector-wide guarantee.  
In contrast to the government acting as an indemnifying agent of an entire 
industry, the Canadian government regularly uses indemnification clauses when making 
agreements with contractors or private companies when entering into specific agreements 
as the proponent of a particular project. This formal use of indemnification clauses in 
contracts exist most often when an entity of the government (in this case most likely the 
‘Operator’) enters into an agreement with another party or business for work required by 
the government (this could be classified as the ‘Contractor’). These types of 
indemnification agreements mirror those found within the business world and easily fall 
into the fault-based indemnification categories described in Table 2.1. The parameters of 
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these indemnification clauses vary, but most are heavily regulated depending on the 
government department and can only be approved by people holding certain government 
positions to ensure that such agreements are at an industry standard and fall under 
appropriate risk parameters (Kari 2019). Arm’s length government entities can 
additionally employ indemnification agreements, which while organized between the 
crown corporation, and another party would have the federal government as the ultimate 
indemnitor should crown corporations find themselves financially insolvent (Poschmann 
2013, 1). 
The Canadian courts exist as a separate branch of government from the ruling and 
administrative arm, however their position on indemnification can be enlightening in how 
the court interprets indemnification contracts. Canada common law does not provide a 
right to indemnity (Kangles et al. 2011, 341). This means that any right to 
indemnification by any party must be created as the result of a contract or through 
legislative means. However, at this time no legislation in Canada either restricts or bars 
indemnification and according to some authors it is unlikely that anti-indemnity 
legislation such as the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act is to be enacted in Canada 
(Ibid, 343). Canadian courts have historically sought to align with the true construction of 
a contract to understand the signed parties’ intentions and therefore determine each 
signatory’s reasonable expectations in regard to liabilities (Ibid). The principle of Contra 
proferentem (which states that in the event of an unclear or ambiguous section of a 
contract the understanding will be interpreted against the party that drafted the document) 
is also often used in Canadian court cases regarding indemnification clauses (Ibid). 
Courts are also historically likely to apply the Contra proferentem for claimants seeking 
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indemnification due to its own negligence (Ibid, 344). This is in line with the preference 
noted by many Canadian courts that those taking on the indemnification risks and 
negligence of others should be outlined in clear standard language to ensure 
understanding by all parties (Ibid, 345). While the rulings by the court have governed the 
actions of industry as to how they draft indemnification agreements, given the lack of 
legislation limiting indemnification agreements it could be argued that the Canadian 
government does not take a leading role in regulating how indemnification clauses are 
drafted. Instead rulings follow in the event of conflict between parties, and government 
indemnification clauses are drafted according to business standards. In this way it is the 
business community that forms an entity’s understanding of what indemnification is 
whether used in a formal or informal way.  
2.4 Indemnification as a Concept  
With the overview of what indemnification means generally, in the oil and gas 
industry and within the context of the Canadian government, this next section will outline 
the manner in which indemnification will be used within this thesis. As previously stated, 
while the Canadian government has not signed official indemnification contracts with the 
oil and gas pipeline industry, it has acted as the de facto indemnifier of the industry 
should projects experience unexpected difficulties that threaten the viability of the project 
to go forward. This is key to note because not only does it position Canadian taxpayers as 
potentially on the hook for infrastructure and industry projects that have no guarantee of 
repayment, it also creates conditions within the industry in which the Canadian 
government carries a significant amount of risk while reward is held in the form of profits 
by private oil and gas companies. This creates a situation of so-called “privatized gains 
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and socialized losses” that does not mirror the free market type of capitalism both the 
Canadian government and oil and gas companies say they are a part of (Ritholtz and Task 
2009, 3). 
The difference between what would be termed as government support (or subsidy) 
and what this paper is calling government indemnification of an industry is helpful to 
expressly state. This is because without this distinction between a subsidy, bailout or 
indemnification it would be easy to say that the government indemnifies all industries, 
thus making the term overly broad. Indemnification therefore is defined as the 
government taking responsibility for the large-scale liabilities faced by the industry to 
sure its continued survival despite the fact that it has or has not encountered significant 
ongoing issues that could create the collapse of the industry. Action by the government is 
therefore taken not just to support a part of a project or company within a sector (often 
known as a subsidy), but the whole sector itself. Indemnification in this case is also 
different from so-called government bailouts. Bailouts can be defined as financial help to 
an entity that would otherwise be on the edge of failure or bankruptcy most likely as a 
result of immediate emergency measures (Block 2010, 160). While indemnification of an 
industry can lead to bailouts of specific projects or sectors, it also serves as a guarantee 
regardless of the outcome of the project, thus differentiating the two.  
Informal government indemnification does not necessarily speak only to the oil 
and gas pipeline industry. In fact, it could be argued that the Canadian government acting 
as an indemnitor has occurred for numerous industries within Canada at various times 
within its history. Examples of the indemnification of industries can particularly be seen 
in the Canadian government’s decisions in 2009 to bail out the automotive industry or the 
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decision in 1993 to buy a significant share in the Hibernia oil project to ensure the 
continuation of the oil industry in Newfoundland (CBC 2018). Both of these examples 
represent not just a subsidy or loan guarantees for specific ventures but direct investments 
in the projects to ensure the continued survival of the industry sector. The government’s 
continual support of the agriculture industry in Canada could also be seen as not just a 
way to support individual initiatives within the industry but a wide scale underwriting of 
the industry. Often the government acting as an indemnitor is justified publicly by stating 
that it is in the national interest to save the industry, the industry is ‘to big to fail’ or that it 
is vital to the Canadian economy (Klein and Le Roy 2010, 228). While these justifications 
may or may not be true, they represent a departure from the capitalist independent free 
market private sector that most of these industries purport to be a part of.  
In the case of pipelines, it is crucial to note that this type of government 
indemnification is not a one-time occurrence, but a systematic policy that has occurred 
over a significant period of time. The result of such long-term direct support therefore not 
just serves to protect pipeline projects in Canada but also can change the behaviour of oil 
pipeline companies and the decisions they make. Ehrlich and Becker (1972, 640) note in 
their theory of self-protection that parties that have certain guarantees will act in a 
different manner than those who have no such certainties in place. They note that a 
change in the guarantees or insurance will change how actors not just make decisions but 
also view risk (Ibid, 641). This phenomenon often called “moral hazard” refers to the 
common circumstance that the presence of market insurance actually can increase the 
probability of hazardous events occurring (Dembe and Boden 2000, 262). As Lakdawalla 
and Zanjani state,  
 43 
since insurance and self-protection are substitutes … a policy aimed at 
encouraging the purchase of insurance simultaneously discourages self-protection. 
Thus government subsidization of insurance can be interpreted, ironically, as a 
policy geared toward encouraging moral hazard (2005, 1892).  
In this way, government actions towards indemnification of industries/projects will affect 
the externalities generated by said project.  
The possibility of government actions affecting industry actions brings forward 
specific public policy concerns regarding indemnification agreements and their ability to 
benefit society as a whole. Kangles et al. (2011, 347) write in regard to indemnification 
that “if liability is allocated to a party incapable of sufficiently compensating losses, or 
where the allocation of risk is the unconscionable result of asymmetrical negotiating 
power, the result may pose a risk to the public.” This is particularly relevant given that a 
government indemnifying a private sector project is not indemnifying a fault-based 
regime that covers mistakes that could be made under their purview. Instead, such actions 
seem to mirror broad based indemnification agreements in which one party agrees to 
cover issues related to the project regardless of who has created the problems inhibiting 
ideal project conditions. Furthermore, as this is not a formal agreement, the government is 
not covered by insurance (as is usually required by such agreements) but instead pays out 
money from its own balance sheet. Such a large difference between the risk bore by both 
parties may seem like good risk management to oil and gas pipeline companies, but in 
reality may simply act as a continuing power imbalance between a strengthening private 
sector and a public sector on the hook for infrastructure projects that encounter issues.  
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As discussed previously, broad indemnity agreements are particularly vulnerable 
to power relations compared to limited or intermediate indemnity agreements. If one 
party is aware due to a history of past financial commitments made by the federal 
government in support of the industry, it decreases the relative bargaining power of the 
government to ensure continuation of the industry without direct monetary intervention. 
Therefore, if an oil and gas company is aware of this history of repeated financial backing 
by the government for their industry, this can serve as an informal indemnification 
agreement in which the company is secure in the knowledge that should the project face 
certain roadblocks, losses or damages the government will step in. In this way, these 
informal indemnification guarantees merely serve as an additional form of risk 
management for pipeline companies and can be built into business plans. What would 
under a free market capitalist system represent regular liabilities and risks associated with 
business ventures can now be written off under new incentives provided by the 
government (Ritholtz and Task 2009, 4). While this serves to decrease risk for oil and gas 
companies, due to the informal ad hoc nature of indemnification for the industry it 
dramatically increases risks faced by the government. In contrast to the formal 
indemnification agreements the government signs in its direct business dealings, there is 
no formal language governing the perimeters of what will or will not be covered by the 
government that can be defended if necessary, in court. Instead it is up to the digression 
of politicians to decide the parameters based on what they feel are politically viable and 
beneficial often under time deadlines to ensure what they feel is needed for the continued 
viability of the project.  
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The case studies analyzed in the forthcoming chapters to answer the questions of 
whether the Canadian oil and gas pipeline industry falls within the parameters of 
indemnification described above. If this industry does fit within this framework it calls 
into question not just the perception of the oil and gas industry within Canada but whether 
the continued policy of indemnification has benefits for the Canadian government and 
Canadian citizens.   
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TransCanada – The Great Pipeline Debate 
The building of the TransCanada pipeline represents the first large government 
indemnification of a pipeline and the start of the federal government’s policy of 
indemnification of the pipeline industry that still occurs in the present day. The pipeline is 
also a significant example of government controversy surrounding of a pipeline. It can be 
argued that it had the most political consequences for a government to date, as it led to the 
direct fall of one government (St. Laurent’s Liberals) and the election of another party 
(John Diefenbaker’s Conservatives). However, in the end, the pipeline would not have 
been built without significant negotiating efforts on the part of the government with 
TransCanada and the personal support of Minister CD Howe to back the building of the 
pipeline. This period of pipeline construction then started the modern policy of 
government support of the pipeline industry. This chapter will provide an overview of the 
way in which the TransCanada pipeline came into creation with a specific focus on 
government efforts to support and then indemnify the process of building the pipeline. 
The first indemnify action by the federal government to help provide a $25 million dollar 
loan to the company when they could not secure supply contracts, when this proved 
politically problematic the government of the day tried to indemnify though a second 
route tried to indemnify the project through the International Development Bank. 
However this also fell though, leading to a third indemnify act, when the government 
agreed to build the Ontario shield portion of the pipeline through a crown corporation and 
lease it back to TransCanada so that they could stay financially viable and gain financing 
for the other portions of the project. The government further provided financing 
guarantees to the company when they could not find financing and provided a direct loan 
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to the company totalling over $80 million in a fourth indemnifying act of the project.  
These actions showcase the start of indemnifying behavior that continued in the pipeline 
industry in the forthcoming years. The chapter will also show how although some 
conditions of this pipeline match Salamon and Siegfried’s theory that explains 
government support for an industry (a small industry size, large firm size and high degree 
of market concentration) other facets are not predictive indicators (The TransCanada 
pipeline had a large geographic dispersion and the company had a low profit rate from 
when the project was proposed to during its build). Overall however, the TransCanada 
pipeline represents a significant indemnifying act, and an example of how certain 
industries can gain government support.  
Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent oversaw the building of the TransCanada 
pipeline and what is now known as “The Great Pipeline Debate.” While the official dates 
of the Great Pipeline Debate are from May 8 to June 6, 1956 and refer to the 
parliamentary debates on the pipeline, the beginning of the TransCanada pipeline in 
actuality spans from its conception in the late 1940’s to 1959 when it underwent its first 
full year of operation (Newman 1993, 7). Following World War II to deal with the 
increased natural gas needs of populous Ontario and Quebec, and the large amount of 
natural gas found in Alberta, it was decided by St. Laurent and his Minister of Commerce 
CD Howe that a Canadian pipeline connecting the two areas would be beneficial (Roberts 
1957, 13).  
In the early 1950’s with the exception of areas in Alberta, natural gas supplied 
only a small amount of energy consumed in Canada. Therefore, it was quite a small 
industry matching the indicator of government support for industry by Salamon and 
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Siegfried. As a fuel and energy source it didn’t surpass wood until 1955, but natural gas 
experienced exponential growth to the amount that by 1960 it became a greater source of 
power than hydroelectric (Kilbourn 1970, 3). In 1969 natural gas supplied 20% of 
Canada’s energy second only to crude oil, but this was years away in the 1950’s (ibid). It 
is key to note that despite the much smaller sector of the energy market that oil and gas 
was a part of, it represented an important component for industrial use (Davis 1957, 133). 
Natural gas had the advantage that it did not require storing or handling by consumers, 
could be supplied regardless of weather and could help to solve urban air pollution (Ibid, 
134). Additionally, during and after World War II, Ontario experienced fuel shortages 
due to a lack of new sources of hydropower and US coal that caused rationing of 
electricity during wartimes (Kilbourn 1970, 14). The discovery of natural gas in Alberta 
provided a possible Canadian-made solution in which could fill this gap (Stenson 1985, 
27). Outside of the Westcoast Transmission pipeline in British Columbia, due to Alberta’s 
moratorium on exporting natural gas, and cautious approach to exporting oil, the industry 
was not large.  
The connecting of western energy with the industrial east when finished would be 
to date the longest line in the world at 2400 miles covering a significant geographic 
distance (Clark 1985, 99). In this case all-natural gas to be exported through the Trans 
Canada pipeline would come from southern Alberta and travel east. It was widely 
understood at the time that future natural gas consumption requirements would need to be 
met almost entirely from Alberta reserves (Royal Commission on Energy 1958, 6). It is 
key to note that the pipeline itself spanned 5 provinces, which could count against charges 
that a geographical concentration would benefit a company in gaining support from the 
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federal government. The sheer distance from the oil fields to the bigger markets in the 
east (Ontario and Quebec) led the pipeline project an air of nation building similar to the 
railways in the minds of government supporters (Newman 1993, 10) In this way, while 
the theory related to geographical dispersion leading to less influence does hold merit 
under some characterizations when looking at financing and oil extraction, it doesn’t 
match what Salamon and Siegfried would state is an ideal for a sector attempting to 
obtain financial support from a government entity. 
While the fastest least expensive route would have crossed into the United States, 
Laurent favoured a pipeline route that while longer and more expensive, would exist 
completely on Canadian land and would not require US approvals. Since during this time 
a large part of the need for a national pipeline route was due to the inability for provinces 
in Canada’s east to reliably be guaranteed oil from the United States, a pipeline that 
avoided US approvals and lobbying was seen as more expedient by the Canadian 
government since the oil being transported was only to be targeted for Canadian use 
(Roberts 1957, 25). Notably, the all-Canadian route would need to cross the Laurentian 
Shield of Northern Ontario. This area of land is known for its rough terrain, rural 
landscapes and space population and industry. Markedly, there were few customers along 
this portion of the route, increasing the difficulty of its financial viability (Hooley 1968, 
14). This combined with not just large swaths of wilderness, but also a lack of road 
infrastructure meant that construction of the pipeline would be extremely expensive 
(Oilweek 2008, 36).  
The firm size of the companies involved in bidding to build the TransCanada was 
quite large for their day and the market was very concentrated. There were only ever a 
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few firms that could be involved directly in the building of the TransCanada pipeline, and 
due to the scale of the project it ended up that the amalgamation of two significant oil and 
gas pipeline companies was needed for the realization of the project. This meant that 
while most pipeline companies were not huge per se, the fact that they existed and could 
gain financing for proposed projects automatically meant that they had a large market 
concentration. This is the case for both Western Pipe Lines Limited and Trans Canada 
Pipelines the two major companies that expressed interest in building a Canada-wide 
pipeline and were eventually combined to form the major proposal to build the pipeline. 
In the early 1950’s it was recognized that there would only be enough surplus reserves in 
southern Alberta for one company to export from the province east to Ontario (Kilbourn 
1970, 26). Parallel pipelines were simply not economically feasible and because of this, it 
meant that not only was their little competition to build the pipeline, but once permits 
were granted only one firm was seeking government support. These conditions combined 
with the market concentration, small industry size and few large firms provided ideal 
conditions for the industry to gain government support.  
The two companies initially in contention to build the TransCanada utilized their 
resources to gain government indemnification for the project, helped out by the structure 
of their industry. There was no danger of free-rider syndrome; as to do so would not 
provide any benefit for companies at all. Instead the American backed Trans Canada 
pipeline company pushed for an all-Canadian pipeline as a way to gain political favour 
(Roberts 1957, 157). They were very successful in doing so, gaining the support of 
Ontario Premier Leslie Frost and several western Members of Parliament during the 
initial proposal stage (Thorburn 1957, 527). Western’s approach was much smaller, and 
 51 
they pushed for a more economical route that would first be built to Winnipeg, allow for 
export to the United States with possible expansion at a later time. However in the end, 
Trans Canada spent twice the amount as Western in feasibility studies and their pipeline 
project did not require approval from of the FPC in the US to allow export by building the 
pipeline through the US so it was chosen (Newman 1993, 9). The agreement of Premier 
Manning of Alberta and PM Laurent in November of 1953 that given the financials any 
pipeline built bringing gas east should be completed by a single company made up of the 
two competitors again increased the size of the company building the Trans Canada 
pipeline, and eliminated any competition for a pipeline along this route (Kilbourn 1970, 
84). From then on having made inroads to guarantee government support, the industry 
was restructured to even better leverage government indemnification.  
In 1954, with increased government support for an all-Canada pipeline, the project 
was approved provided that the Western Pipelines Limited and Trans Canada Company 
come together to form one company (Grey 1970, 186). The deal effectively saw Western 
Pipelines become a wholly owned subsidiary of the new TransCanada Pipe Lines 
Company (Royal Commission on Energy 1958, 57). It was hoped that this newly formed 
company combined with approval for Alberta oil and gas regulatory authorities to allow 
export of oil outside the province that the pipeline could go ahead as up to that point 
Alberta had not allowed the export of any of its natural gas reserves. Approval by the 
province would allow the vision of an all-Canadian west to east line to be realized. It is 
key to note that once permits were obtained by the newly amalgamated company in 1955, 
there was significant incentive for construction to continue with that same company 
despite the issues with financing and approval that are outlined below. In this way larger 
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firms did not just help company’s bid along the pipeline route, but the amalgamation of 
them into an even larger company helped them to keep the bid when issues with the 
pipeline arose. 
Although the oil and gas pipeline industry in Canada during this time was highly 
concentrated, Trans Canada Company and Western Pipeline Limited were not the only 
pipeline companies operating within Canada. During the start of the 1950’s very few 
large-scale pipelines had been built writ-large. Although the Westcoast Transmission 
pipeline (Trans Mountain pipeline) brought forward by Frank McMahon represented 
another large player on the pipeline scene, the company headed by McMahon was quite 
focused on capturing the Pacific Northwest market during the early 1950’s (Gray 1970, 
152). By the time he proposed an alternative to the Trans Canada later in the decade, 
entrenched interests meant that the Trans Canada company was the only company with 
engineering plans and had $15 million dollars invested in their version of the pipeline, 
even if the plan they presented was seen as controversial (Kilbourn 1970, 104). 
McMahon’s proposal was better than the other alternative proposal brought forward by 
the Toronto investment firm of Gairdner and Company which required the government to 
invest $100 million in unsecured junior bonds (an unacceptable risk according to the 
government) (Kilbourn 1970, 115).  However, McMahon’s proposal also required much 
more American support than Trans Canada’s, and while he sought no government 
assistance on the pipeline during its initial proposal he withdrew his proposal before it 
could be seriously considered by the House of Commons (Montreal Gazette 1956). This 
meant in practice that TransCanada despite having a few competing proposals to build the 
pipeline across Canada had cornered the large amount of market backing that they needed 
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to have the pipeline actually constructed with few alternatives should the government 
want to encourage more companies to present competing proposals. These were ideal 
industry structure conditions for a company to gain government support.  
3.1 TransCanada Indemnification 
The first indemnifying actions related to the TransCanada pipeline occurred in 
1954. While obtaining approval from Board of Transport Commissioners in Ottawa, the 
TransCanada company discovered that potential gas purchasers did not consider the Trans 
Canada project financially feasible (Gray 1970, 193). Instead, they were focused on 
getting oil sourced from the United States via the Niagara Border which they thought 
would be cheaper. Additionally, gas suppliers in Alberta did not want to sign supply and 
sales contracts as they hoped to export instead to the more profitable US market (Gray 
1970, 197). The company had difficulty securing supply contracts in Quebec and as it 
took longer to prove financial feasibility also in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. This 
difficulty gaining both financial institutional backing and supply contracts led to the 
TransCanada board to ask the federal government for payments due in the first years on 
mortgage bonds the company could not meet through depreciation and net earnings 
(Kilbourn 1970, 60). At this time, the amount was thought to be not more than a $25 
million investment compared to the overall cost of construction that was set at $350 
million (Gray 1970, 195). This loan would then be paid back with interest once a 
guarantee on the bonds was no longer needed. This represented the first action on the part 
of the company to seek government backing.  
While this loan deal used what was termed an arms-length crown entity, all parties 
involved understood that the deal effectively led to the federal government underwriting 
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the pipeline project. When the company presented the idea to CD Howe on January 6, 
1955, he was amenable but encountered pushback from his cabinet colleagues. The 
Minister of Finance, Walter Harris, at the time when writing to Howe stated,  
The request for a guarantee raises awkward problems of precedent and past 
practice. Apart from defence production, there are no recent precedents for direct 
guarantees on marketable securities to large-scale private industries (Howe 1956, 
3664). 
 
The fact that CD Howe who was best known as a war-time minister shows how the 
pipeline industry had successfully sold themselves to be “essential” to the function of the 
government, and from this the second indemnifying act can be seen. However, due to the 
pushback to a direct loan from the federal government, a loan was suggested through the 
Industrial Development Bank carried out with the Bank of Canada, its parent body 
(Clarke 1985, 100).  On March 13, the bank and Trans Canada agreed to the bank taking 
$25 million in equity in convertible debentures with these not to be converted until 
earnings per share reached $1.25 and that the bank then pay $2.50 above the $10 price of 
common shares to be offered to the public (Kilbourn 1970, 72). To show the bank’s 
confidence in the project the bank took $5 million worth of shares before they went on 
sale to the public and making the banks. This made the bank’s commitment effectively 
$60 million in convertible debentures and $5 million in common shares. This would leave 
$245 million in mortgage bonds to be sold to finance the rest of the project (Clarke 1985, 
102). A January 26, 1955 memo to the Prime Minister states that the government is 
providing capital required for the pipeline project “no matter how cleverly we distinguish 
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this case.” (Kilbourn 1970, 67) Unfortunately, this deal fell through when the Governor of 
the Bank of Canada insisted on the bank having voting shares. This created a situation in 
which suppliers who had policies of not selling to government-controlled entities would 
not agree to sell to the pipeline, presenting significant financing issues for the pipeline 
(Gray 1970, 196). This action showcases how event this far back in history oil companies 
saw themselves as independent and separate from government enterprises despite the fact 
that certain companies in their sector needed substantial government support to survive. It 
is interesting however that by oil companies taking this position, instead of preventing 
government support of the pipeline industry it may have instead just led to an instance in 
which the government continued to indemnify and support the industry without having 
the ability to hold voting shares or direct control of the companies building certain 
pipelines. In this way, the second attempt to indemnify the TransCanada project fell 
through.  
It was decided that, as a result of the failed financing, the pipeline could not be 
built during the construction season of 1955 and construction would have to wait for 
successful funding. By the spring of 1955 the outlook of the TransCanada was in doubt 
with the Globe and Mail hypothesizing that the project was “dead” (1955). While 
financing had been found for the Toronto Montreal section of the line, the northern 
Ontario section could not find financing (Kilbourn 1970, 88), effectively crippling the 
project because this section of the pipeline represented the most expensive and time-
consuming section. It would however not be the end of TransCanada seeking government 
support in order to build the pipeline and a third indemnifying act would occur.  
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Despite the pipeline being described as dead, solutions continued to be sought 
within the government so that the pipeline could go forward, leading to the third instance 
of the government indemnifying the project so that it could continue. A finance official 
then proposed to build the pipeline through northern Ontario and lease it for operation to 
a company. The idea was that the government would therefore not guarantee high profits 
to private stockholders through direct funding for financing but would still be able to push 
pipeline construction forward (Ibid 89). To accomplish this the government would use a 
crown corporation (which could run as a private business rather than a part of the civil 
service) to build the proposed pipeline from the Manitoba border to Kapuska-sing, 
Ontario (Canada 2018). The company would go on to be called the Northern Ontario Pipe 
Line Corporation, and while a neat solution to existing problems in reality was still an 
entity of the government. This proposal would mean that other parts of the pipeline could 
be financed privately, and Trans Canada would be able to secure suppliers who had 
previously denied them due to the government’s control under the International 
Development Bank deal. While the deal was described as “not a subsidy” by Howe 
(House of Commons 1956, 3664) by effectively indemnifying the most expensive part of 
the pipeline the government of Canada and Ontario (from whom the corporation received 
its powers from) was essentially indemnifying not just its construction but the most risky 
portion of the project. Capitalization for the crown corporation was achieved through 
direct advances from the Ontario and federal government rather than guaranteed bonds to 
the public (Thorburn 1957, 522), meaning the government would be on the hook pipeline 
could produce a return on investment. It was estimated the cost to build this portion of the 
pipeline would total $118 million in the fall of 1955 (Glenbow Archives 1955). The deal 
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included a clause in which Trans-Canada would purchase this section of the line from the 
crown corporation as soon as it was able (Glenbow Archives 1956). While this agreement 
represents a significant amount of the indemnification action taken by the government, it 
was not the only action taken to ensure pipeline construction across the country.  
After the signing of the crown corporation agreement, in order to get a guarantee 
on the amount of steel needed to build the pipeline for the 1956 season, TransCanada was 
forced when it could not find traditional financing for steel to seek other sources of 
financing. The steel had to be manufactured in the US, as Canada did not have the 
capacity, and due to a world steel shortage, money had to be given upfront to guarantee 
an order would be accepted. In the end a deal was struck with American oil companies 
the Tennessee Gas Transmission, Continental Oil and Canadian Gulf to cover the $40 
million needed. In exchange they would each receive 17% of the shares of Trans-Canada 
with a guaranteed 51% controlling interest until a public offering of shares with the 
opportunity for regaining of Canadian ownership (Royal Commission on Energy 1958, 
58). While this turned out to be very controversial politically, it also effectively meant 
that three of the four largest gas producers in Alberta now had a stake of the project. Thus 
commenced  “The Great Pipeline Debate” and the introduction and debate on legislation 
for the Northern Ontario Crown Corporation in 1956 after both the deal for the crown 
corporation had been signed and TransCanada was ‘taken over’ by US interests in the 
words of critics of the pipeline (Grey 1970, 208).  
The creation of this crown corporation however was not the only finance 
support the federal government provided, and a further fourth indemnifying act 
occurred after the setting up of the Northern Ontario Crown Corporation. The 
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pipeline needed further support in light of anti-American sentiment and further 
delays in financing the western portion of the pipeline. Howe was of the impression 
that missing the 1956 construction season was untenable but thought that outright 
ownership of the pipeline was still not in the government’s interest (Roberts 1957, 
178). Instead on April 11, 1956 he negotiated that the government would give 
TransCanada a guarantee that if the company failed to find financing for the whole 
western section of the line, the government would finance it at 90% cost as long as 
the company found the other 10% by the November 1, 1956 deadline (Glenbow 
Archives 1956). This guarantee was then going to be used to obtain bank loans in 
order to finance the project, providing indemnification for investors in this portion 
of the pipeline by having government guarantees if the company could not find the 
whole 90%. Unfortunately, banks in New York still saw the project as too risky 
without guarantees on the export of natural gas to the US from the Winnipeg 
portion of the pipeline and the company could not close any bank loans (Kilbourn 
1970, 97).  A loan proposal was then proposed and brought before cabinet on May 
7th as the pipeline debate raged in the House of Commons (Blakley 1956). In the 
end a loan was agreed with the government advancing a portion not exceeding 90% 
of the cost of the construction of the western portion of the pipeline at an interest 
rate of 5% for a short period (Glenbow Archives 1956). The government’s loan in 
real numbers was estimated to be an amount of up to $80 million and the language 
was included in the bill bringing the Northern Ontario Crown Corporation into 
existence (Ibid). The loan was described by Howe in the House of Commons as a 
short term loan with extremely tough conditions made necessary due to the fact that 
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the pipeline was not financeable in ordinary capital markets since the US regulator 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) would not grant approval for the export of 
gas down to the US (Howe 1956, 3665). In fact, a number of cabinet ministers were 
explicitly against the idea of loan guarantees for TransCanada as they saw it as 
being painted as helping big business on the path to profit by opposition parties 
(Kilborn 1970, 63). Of the pipeline itself it was said right before the Parliamentary 
debates on the TransCanada pipeline itself in March that “If the [TransCanada 
pipeline] were to be a sure-fire profit bonanaza it would have been already built. 
The fact is it won’t be. It will be a low interest affair (The Financial Post 1956).” 
After being pushed through Parliament in an unprecedented manner the bill was 
pass on June 6th and received Royal Assent on June 7th, just a few hours before the 
contract between the Trans Canada Company and the federal government was set to 
expire to finance construction (Thorburn 1957, 525). A week later construction 
crews started building the western section of the pipeline financed by government 
money.  
In the end it could be argued that forming a crown corporation and providing a 
loan to back the TransCanada was a hugely successful endeavour. It was estimated that it 
would take five years after the pipeline reached full capacity for TransCanada to pay the 
government back and for TransCanada to gain full title of the pipeline, instead it took four 
and was completed in 1962 (TransCanada Pipe Lines Ltd 1962, 6). All of the money 
loaned plus by the government to build the western portion of the pipeline plus interest 
was paid back in full after a successful finance offering to the public in 1957 
(TransCanada Pipe Lines Ltd 1957, 9).  
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Until the TransCanada pipeline was built for all intents and purposes the 
TransCanada Company was simply a paper company and did not have the large profit 
rates noted by Salamon and Siegfried that help an industry secure government support 
(Hooley 1968, 45). In fact, many Alberta oil and gas producers opposed exporting gas 
eastwards as they feared that the risks involved with the profitability of the pipeline could 
hurt them economically and would affect the sector’s profit rates (Kilbourn 1970, 34). 
Many of the Canadian pipeline companies formed during this time were often newly 
incorporated and therefore could not boast of great profit rates as they had few guaranteed 
revenue sources. Although some pipeline companies had secured financing, Trans-
Canada’s profit rates were effectively nothing until the 1960’s (Ibid, 200-201). The 
pipeline however never could have been built without the government taking on 
significant risk and indemnifying the Trans Canada by allowing them to have the capital 
backing and the security of knowing the federal government was indemnifying their 
actions.  
3.2 Conclusion 
Kilbourn writes of the TransCanada company,  
in the end the pipeline became for its backers a matter of pride and honour beyond 
all rational economic sense: a test of their own willingness to survive an ordeal, a 
symbol of their ability to triumph over doubts and difficulties, an act of faith in 
progress or Canada or whatever sub-diety lured them on. (Kilbourn 1970, 24)  
The same could be said of the federal government’s willingness to back and indemnify 
the project. Not just once, but over and over again the government provided support to the 
pipeline. TransCanada’s success lobbying the government could potentially be explained 
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by its relatively large firm size, the small size of the natural gas industry and the market 
concentration of the company. Profit rate however is not a good description of how the 
company could have gained influence as its financial viability was repeatedly questioning 
and the company did not make money until well after the pipeline was constructed. 
Geographical dispersion helps to explain the industry’s lobbying power when looking at 
the concentration of its fiscal backing and the concentration of natural gas extraction. 
However, the large area covered by the pipeline works against the theory that smaller 
geographical diffusion leads to stronger lobby efforts. Ultimately the Liberal 
government’s indemnification of the TransCanada pipeline tied the project of the pipeline 
to the government’s fate. CD Howe wrote to a director of the TransCanada on June 22 
saying, “I’m afraid the future of our government depends to a considerable extent on the 
ability of TransCanada to finance the pipeline and pay off the government loan (Kilborne 
1970, 140).” The government had indemnified TransCanada by providing financial 
guarantees, loans through banks, set up crown corporations to help build portions of the 
line and when they still had financing issues provided direct loans to the company. While 
TransCanada was able to finance and pay off their government guarantees, the future of 
Howe’s Liberal government did not live to see it and the indemnification of future 
pipelines was passed onto successive governments. 
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Line 9 
In January of 1974 the federal government under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott 
Trudeau announced a new government policy on pipelines. This policy sought to create 
an all-Canadian coast-to-coast pipeline network to ensure Canadian self-reliance on oil 
(Canada 1976, 152). It was under this policy that the Sarnia to Montreal pipeline 
extension (also known as Line 9) was formally announced, leading to three significant 
instances of government indemnification of this pipeline. These acts of indemnification 
ensured first, a specific amount of oil would be run through the pipeline second, 
guaranteed the line against losses for a period of 20 years, and third provided the 
company with a government option to buy the pipeline. In this way, the Canadian federal 
government’s policy of indemnification continued, with the company charged with 
building Line 9 Interprovincial Pipe Line Company (Interprovincial) gaining significant 
government support without which the project would not have gone forward. The 
structure of the oil and gas pipeline industry at this time in some ways mirrored the ideal 
structure for government support put forward by Salamon and Siegfried, and in other 
ways differed slightly. The industry at that time was composed of firms of a large size 
who had a high profit rate in a highly concentrated industry. Line 9 itself was built within 
a high concentration of geographical dispersion covering only two provinces in contrast 
to other larger-scale projects. However, the size of the oil and gas pipeline industry had 
grown significantly since the 1950’s and while not huge could more accurately be 
described as a medium industry relative to the general economy of Canada at that time. 
While Salamon and Siegfried note that a small industry is ideal for government support, 
given that the pipeline industry is but a part of the overall oil and gas industry in the 
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country some of the same factors that encourage government support in small industries 
can be seen in the larger ones. This will be explored in greater detail in the following 
chapter which will detail how the pipeline was built, financed and indemnified. 
4.1 The Need to Build Line 9 
The expansion of the Sarnia to Montreal pipeline project has its roots in the 
changes to the North American oil and gas market in the early 1970’s. Prior to 1971, the 
United States had a Mandatory Oil Import Program, which greatly influenced the extent 
to which Canadian companies could export Canadian oil to the US. However, in 1971 in 
light of increasing demand and cresting oil production in the country, the US revoked the 
Mandatory Oil Import program to import as much oil and gas as Canada was able to 
provide (Whyte 2010, 45). This created immediate pressure on the Canadian government 
from the oil and gas industry to support the construction of oil and gas pipelines from the 
north across the border to the US in the south rather than focus on supplying oil 
domestically (Gray 2000, 36). There was also the perception on the part of the industry 
that Canada possessed a “virtually unlimited” supply of oil and gas in the late 1960’s, one 
that was quite quickly challenged in the early 1970’s (Bregha 1979, 24). In December of 
1972, the NEB advised the federal government cabinet that Canada would not have 
enough oil to meet both its domestic needs and the ongoing export levels in the next year 
(Gray 2000, 50). These issues were then compounded by OPEC’s supply embargo, which 
saw imported oil into Montreal going from an average price in the early 1970’s of $2.45 a 
barrel to $13.00 in 1973 (Ibid). At this time Montreal was entirely dependent on imported 
oil, as no pipeline carrying Canadian oil travelled further east than the Ottawa valley 
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(Ontario 1978, 1). Because of this, the federal government began looking for solutions 
that could secure Canada’s oil supply and make Canada more energy self-sufficient.  
The first indemnifying action of the government of Line 9 occurred in 1973. In 
response to increasing world prices and decreasing domestic supply, in September of 
1973 the government announced its intention of extending the Interprovincial pipeline 
that existed in Sarnia to Montreal (New York Times 1973). At that time the area east of 
the Ottawa valley was reliant exclusively on foreign oil as no Canadian oil could run east 
through pipelines to them (Toronto Star 1976). In December the Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau stood in the House of Commons and announced a new national oil policy for 
Canada. This proposal encompassed three initiatives meant to shield Canada from the 
instability of the international market. These measures were the expansion of the pipeline 
owned by Interprovincial Pipeline Company to Montreal from Sarnia, a temporary freeze 
on oil prices, and an oil export tax based on the difference between domestic and world 
oil prices to raise funds and shield Canadian consumers from the steep increases in 
imported oil (Doern and Toner 1985, 91). It is key to note that focus on the later two 
policies, combined with the later announcement of a new national oil price and the 
creation of a new publicly owned national oil company (Petro-Canada) greatly 
outweighed the media focus on the pipeline expansion project. This had the effect of 
overshadowing what could have been controversy over support of such a large capital 
investment on the part of the federal government if announced during another time. This 
could easily have been a particular media focus by itself as Trudeau had announced his 
decision to extend the pipeline to Montreal on national television in November and on 
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December 6 in the House of Commons stated that the extension of the pipeline was “the 
single most urgent step towards attainment of our national goals (McDougall 1982, 135).” 
The Line 9 pipeline showcases the government’s all-in approach to indemnifying 
the pipeline sector in Canada, so much so that very little opposition was encountered in 
contrast to when support for the Trans Canada was announced in the 1950’s. The Line 9 
pipeline was primarily built to deal with oil scarcity in eastern Canada (caused by 
increased import prices and western Canadian oil travelling to the US). It is notable that 
the pipeline was only looked at as a policy solution when the federal government failed to 
secure an oil swap arrangement with the United States (Whyte 2010, 61). This deal 
sought to maintain oil exports at a specific level if the Americans did so as well but the 
US would not agree to such a deal. This meant that despite the Energy Minister stating 
that the “obvious and first” starting point for the government to come to an agreement 
with the US that allowed for the stabilized existing market arrangements to ensure a lack 
of scarcity the government was forced to look to alternative methods and act quickly to 
ensure oil prices could be levelled (McDougall 1982, 135). It also meant that the approval 
of the pipeline by the NEB was politicized to a degree as it had already been declared in 
the public interest by the government when they declared the expansion of Line 9 as the 
acceptable alternative when negotiating with the US fell through (Whyte 2010, 81).  
Indemnification by the federal government for Line 9 was surrounded by much 
less controversy than TransCanada in the 1950’s. Although the expansion of the Sarnia to 
Montreal line was technically a matter under the NEB’s jurisdiction, and questions were 
asked about the federal government’s power to approve pipelines over the head of the 
NEB this quickly became inconsequential in the urgency of finding a solution to 
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increasing oil costs (McDougall 1982, 135). However, because both the Conservative and 
NDP opposition supported the expansion of the pipeline in principle little controversy 
occurred in the House of Commons on the issue. This could also be due to the fact that a 
bill didn’t have to pass through the House of Commons for the pipeline to be built (Ibid). 
In fact, some members of the opposition wished the government to go further and 
supported public ownership of the proposed pipeline or the construction of a new 
Canadian line to bypass American port access points (Douglas and Dionne 1973, 7216, 
7225). In this way, indemnification of Line 9 garnered much more government-wide 
support than TransCanada, and similar to the past a Canada only solution was eventually 
settled on using indemnification policies set in place by the federal government.   
Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited was a company that displayed many of the 
industry structure facets helpful to gain government support described by Salamon and 
Siegfried. Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited owned an existing pipeline that ran from 
Edmonton, Alberta to the US border near Manitoba, and pipeline that ran from Sarnia, 
Ontario to Port Credit Ontario as well as other pipelines in the US. Because of the 
placement of its existing pipeline infrastructure Interprovincial was the logical company 
to add approximately 520 miles of pipeline needed to connect Sarnia to Montreal. The 
company was a significantly large player in the Canadian pipeline industry, operating 
large lines across most of the country. Interprovincial in 1963 became the largest crude 
oil carrier on a barrel-mile basis and by 1972 the company’s average deliveries were 
above the million barrels per day metric (Enbridge 2019). Due to the large variety of 
pipeline that Interprovincial owned they oversaw a significant portion of the market 
concentration. This is also because although there were more pipeline companies in 
 67 
Canada than in the 1950’s, due to the concentrated nature of the oil industry in Canada 
and the large capital costs of building pipelines, the industry was focused on a few large 
companies. This combination of large firms and a high market concentrated set up ideal 
circumstances for the industry to continue to receive government support.  
As the project progressed Interprovincial encountered issues numerous issues with 
the building of the pipeline. While the NEB started hearings on the Line 9 extension in 
May of 1974, these hearings mostly concerned the proposed pipeline route through 
Quebec. Concerns regarding financing of the line were not brought to the Board until 
October 9, 1974 (National Energy Board 1975, 3). At that time Interprovincial stated that 
they had concerns regarding the continued ability of the company to secure Western oil 
supplies to send through the line to Montreal and other areas of the Canadian market. Due 
to this, the company expressed doubts as to their ability to finance the Sarnia to Montreal 
extension and requested that hearings be adjourned until the matter could be settled (Ibid, 
4). This request was granted, and it was understood that the NEB would not meet until 
hearings were initiated by Interprovincial to clarify its final position on the pipeline.  
Interprovincial saw the Sarnia to Montreal extension as problematic financially for 
a number of reasons. In October of 1974, the NEB released its supply-demand forecast. 
This report showed a potential for a lack of Canadian oil available to Canadian markets as 
of 1982, which stood in sharp contrast to the forecasting of endless Canadian oil only a 
few years before (National Energy Board 1974, 6). This was particularly important 
because Interprovincial stated that the business risk for the pipeline was much greater 
than other sections of pipeline they had added to their network. Interprovincial at the time 
could not get Montreal refiners to enter into any throughput or shipping agreements to 
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ensure that Line 9 would be used after its construction, leading to uncertain and lower 
revenue guarantees for the pipeline (National Energy Board 1975, 21). Instead refiners 
wanted guarantees from the government that using domestic oil would not cost them any 
more than using imported oil (Toronto Star 1976). For Interprovincial this lack of supply 
agreements meant that it would take Interprovincial approximately 15 years to recoup its 
capital investment on the line when it’s average for a project of this nature would be 10 
with throughput and shipping agreements in place (Ibid, 22). Given these issues and the 
uncertainty of even getting Canadian oil through their pipeline in the future at a required 
volume that justified operation of the pipeline (250 Mb/d) the company decided that it 
“could not proceed with the project without some support” (Ibid). This was the beginning 
of Interprovincial’s attempts to secure government indemnification for the project.  
It is key to note that Interprovincial stating they could not proceed with the project 
without support was just as much an opening position to negotiate with the government as 
it was a statement of fact on the viability of a pipeline project. Interprovincial was aware 
of the necessity of the pipeline in the government’s view. These type of public statements 
showcase how indemnification supports the pipeline industry when market conditions for 
pipelines change to make them less financially profitable. Due to this, financial problems 
on the line were not simply a reason to shut down the project but instead showcase how 
the company can use its “risk management” abilities to call in the informal 
indemnification protect granted to the pipeline industry. Thus, negotiations started with 
the Federal Government and the first steps toward realization of the indemnification of 
Line 9 started.  
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4.2 Line 9 Indemnification 
While the federal government had been involved in encouraging the expansion of 
Line 9, it was not until 1974 that the first clear instances of indemnification occurred. 
This then progressed to the federal government showcasing the many ways that they were 
willing to indemnify the project throughout the life of the pipeline. The first action of 
indemnification on the part of the federal government occurred in the fall of 1974 with a 
guarantee of oil supply to Line 9 and was brought about by a number of factors. The 
failure of the Sarnia to Montreal pipeline to go forward had the potential to go against the 
set policies of the Trudeau Liberal government. In January of 1974 they had announced a 
policy of establishing an all-Canadian coast-to-coast pipeline network. This policy had its 
roots in the government’s need to establish self-sufficiency for Canada and its cornerstone 
was the expansion of the Interprovincial pipeline expansion to Montreal (An Energy 
Strategy for Canada 1976, 152). The area requiring support was therefore quite 
geographically concentrated leading to a higher likelihood that the government would be 
willing to provide support. This was because any pipeline expansion needed to be able to 
directly serve eastern markets and link in with existing pipeline infrastructure, limiting 
the number of alternative companies that could oversee a project of this scale. The federal 
government was fully committed to the pipeline and the Minister of Energy, Mines and 
Resources Donald Macdonald stated to the media that Ottawa was considering building 
the pipeline itself if Interprovincial backed out of the plan, a sure sign of the level of 
indemnification that the government had for the sector (Toronto Star 1974). 
In light of the government’s statements that they would provide support 
Interprovincial pushed for greater levels of indemnification of Line 9. Interprovincial 
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requested that the government pay a share of Line 9’s fixed operating costs, which at the 
time would have cost the government $25 million a year (Toronto Star 1975). 
Negotiations were ongoing however and instead a letter was sent on November 19, 1974 
from Minister Macdonald providing reassurance that Line 9 would be used to an average 
250 Mb/d of the 350 Mb/d total capacity that it could hold. This was realized because the 
government agreed to take measures to ensure a market for western Canadian crude in the 
amount of 250,000 barrels per day to eastern Canada (Ibid, Appendix I). Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the larger amount of oil headed for export to the US at the time 
this action was taken, and thereby had the federal government stating that they would 
limit exports of oil if necessary to ensure oil made its way to Montreal markets. A 
guarantee of this nature indemnified the project because it provided an assured amount of 
customers.    
This was however not enough guarantee for the company and further 
indemnifying actions were sought by the company leading to the second instance of 
indemnification. Negotiations continued until the federal government ultimately agreed 
that given issues with financing the company was facing, they would reimburse 
Interprovincial for any revenue amounts that fell short of covering the fixed and variable 
costs of the pipeline extension (Toronto Star 1975). This was agreed to in January of 1975 
and then passed through Cabinet in the subsequent months. It was agreed formally on 
April 8, 1975 and outlined that for a period of 20 years from the date in which the 
company was granted approval from the NEB the government would cover the revenue 
losses of Interprovincial (National Energy Board 2014, 8). The agreement notably did not 
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guarantee the company any profits but did effectively indemnify the company against any 
losses from this section of the pipeline (Ibid, 23).  
These measures of government support are highlighted by actions taken by the 
company to secure financing that could only have been realized by both short and long 
term guarantees to indemnify the project. Following the formal agreement in April of 
1975, Interprovincial decided that given this agreement and the letter assuring use of the 
pipeline it would proceed. This decision to proceed was not without qualifications 
however as the company stated that it was only going forward with the project “in the 
interests of national security, but it would not have done so otherwise because of the 
questionable prospects of realizing a reasonable profit for the shareholders on the 
undertaking.” (Ibid, 23) The company following agreement with its underwriters that the 
project was financeable proposed to raise the entire capital cost (at that time estimated at 
$185 million) through debentures in Canada. This was proposed to be split into one serial 
debenture totally $45 million covering one to five years and an additional $140 million of 
20 year sinking fund debentures. In between securing this money, $60 million dollars of 
bridge financing was arranged with bankers to cover construction of the project (Ibid). It 
is key to note that this financing was finalized after the government agreed to indemnify 
the project in the short term through guaranteed supply side, but also in the long term by 
guaranteeing no losses for the company on this project for 20 years. Without both 
indemnifying acts the company would have had significant financing issues and would 
probably not have proceeded with the project.  
One further adjustment was agreed upon given the new oil uncertainty in Canada. 
Given the long-term uncertainty regarding the availability of Canadian oil it was decided 
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that the pipeline should be built so that oil could flow in either direction (National Energy 
Board 1975, 10). This meant that if oil was discovered on the east coast of Canada it 
could flow west, but practically also meant that imported especially overseas oil could 
potentially flow into Ontario via another non-US route. Building the pipeline in this 
manner created a potentially more profitable and therefore more financeable product in a 
world where oil supply was uncertain.  
The size of Interprovincial helped it to secure the terms that they wanted when 
building Line 9. Given these indemnifying agreements with the federal government, 
Interprovincial requested hearings at the NEB regarding the Sarnia to Montreal expansion 
on February 21, 1975. A meeting was held explicitly on the financibility of the project on 
April 11, 1975. At this time Interprovincial presented their agreement with the Federal 
government to the NEB board and the NEB approved them in May of 1975 (National 
Energy Board 1975, 4). The NEB proceedings are another instance in which 
Interprovincial’s firm size and influence can be a predictor of positive government 
decisions. Farm landowners angry about the proposed route of Line 9 vocalized 
frustration. One farmer stated that there was a significant disadvantage for smaller 
interveners in the Sarnia-Montreal pipeline NEB hearings in terms of time, money and 
legal experience compared to the Interprovincial Pipe Line Company (Lucas and Bell 
1977, 84-87). However, given the power of the company, government backing and 
importance put on the pipeline during the oil crisis of the 1970’s these protests did not 
have the ability to significantly derail the project.  
By the mid-1970’s the government’s policy of indemnification led to millions of 
dollars in costs for the federal entity. Line 9 was built for $250 million in 1975 and 
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became fully operational on June 4, 1976 with a throughput capacity of 315,000 barrels 
per day (Enbridge 2019). The significantly larger capital costs for the pipeline was due to 
bad weather during construction, increased construction costs and issues with pressure 
testing that required the line to be examined and repaired after its initial operation 
(Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited 1976, 4). These increased capital costs through further 
debenture financing in 1976 and 1977 (Toronto Star 1976). The requirement by the NEB 
that Interprovincial sell oil at the same rates to Montreal as Toronto was also put into 
effect in 1976 (Slocum 1979). This required the federal government making up the 
difference between the actual cost of operating the pipeline and the revenue they were 
allowed to charge which in 1976 totalled $20.2 million (Ibid, 3). This represented a 
significant cost to the federal government as a result of the indemnifying guarantees that 
they had provided Interprovincial regarding the pipeline.  
There was however a third indemnification act agreed to by the federal 
government for Interprovincial. On February 25, 1977 the federal government and 
Interprovincial signed an additional agreement that provided the federal government the 
option to purchase Line 9 (National Energy Board 2014, 8). This further indemnified the 
pipeline, as there was a clause in the contract, which allowed the Federal government to 
purchase the Montreal extension from Interprovincial during the course of their 20-year 
agreement. It also provided further assurance to the company and any 
financers/shareholders that in the event of year after year losses the federal government 
would step in and take over the entire liability for the pipeline. This was particularly 
important as given the $29 million-dollar gap in revenue owed by the federal government 
to Interprovincial, the pipeline was not a money-making enterprise. Instead, the pipeline 
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was operating at a significant loss, only made viable by the indemnifying agreements put 
forward to the company by the federal government.  
This agreement came on the heels of a 1976 NEB ruling that the company should 
be regulated using a rate base concept used by utilities effectively buffering 
Interprovincial from regulations by indemnifying the company against set rates (Globe 
and Mail 1978). This stood in contrast to the previous system in which Interprovincial 
filed its proposed tariffs with the NEB and revenues were dependent on the amount of oil 
running through the pipeline (Slocum 1979). Interprovincial had attempted to convince 
the NEB that an additive fee of 61.5 cents needed to be added to oil travelling through 
Sarnia, however the NEB only agreed to a 20 cent tariff, effectively guaranteeing in the 
words of the company “another substantial deficiency payment on the part of the federal 
government in respect of 1977” (Interprovincial 1976, 3). The agreement with the federal 
government to provide an option to buy Line 9 came on the heels of a year (1977) in 
which Interprovincial posted earnings of $1.71 per share which were the second highest 
in the company’s history (Interprovincial 1977, 3). However, the NEB in 1977 also 
allowed no rate of return for the Sarnia to Montreal line on the premise that the line was 
financed by debt (Ibid). This created a situation in which continued government 
indemnification was needed to support the pipeline year after year.  
In this way, profit based on individual pipelines is not a good indicator of a 
company’s ability to influence the government, but the overall profitability of pipeline 
companies can indicate their ability to gain government support. This is because pipeline 
companies will often have lines that vary on profitability over time depending on the 
price of oil, source of that oil, types of government regulations and a whole host of other 
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possibilities that can occur. It can be argued however that the company making larger 
profits did allow it to have the resources to lobby the government for the significant 
support that they were able to obtain for the line, showcasing how profitability can benefit 
large companies looking to gain government support. While high company profits cannot 
always be perfectly correlated with increased government support, the option to buy, 
while never actualized did provide reassurance to Interprovincial, their backers and 
shareholders. In a climate in which high tariffs were no longer guaranteed and it was 
unclear that the pipeline would be profitable, an option to buy represented assurance in 
the face of an unknown future. The government may not have been publicly supportive of 
the growing profits of Interprovincial, but they were however willing to indemnify the 
company against losses down the line giving the company significant support in a sector 
known for its cyclical nature. This form of support could only benefit a company, 
encouraging it to become dependent on government indemnification in the future.  
Twenty years after the government helped to build Line 9, it divested its interests 
in the pipeline. An agreement was announced by the federal government that 
Interprovincial would continue to both own and operate Line 9 and that Canada was 
released from any “rights and obligations” from the previously signed agreements 
(National Energy Board 2014, 8). Interprovincial purchased the government’s option to 
acquire Line 9 for $10.3 million dollars. Although the federal government sought other 
offers for the pipeline with a reservation price of $20 million no other party submitted a 
bid (National Energy Board 1997, 60). The government’s indemnification of Line 9 had 
led to not just years of million-dollar payments, but also the sale of the line below market 
value. This sort of support could only be explained by viewing the government’s actions 
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as indemnification of the large-scale liabilities that the pipeline industry took on. 
Indemnification of this project ensured that the company had a guarantor who could 
smooth any issues that the project encountered and ensure its viability when faced with 
changing conditions.  
In the next year a request to the NEB was made to reverse the flow of oil through 
the pipeline. Additionally, annual reports by Interprovincial show that payments were 
made throughout the 1980’s in the high single digit millions and into the 1990’s where 
continued payments of around $10 million were made (Interprovincial 1982, 10; 
Interprovincial 1991, 50). In 1999, the NEB granted approval and the direction of the 
flow of oil in Line 9 was reversed to allow for the westward travel of up to 240,000 
barrels per day of offshore crude (Enbridge 2019). The government provided 
Interprovincial with hundreds of millions of dollars over 20 years to keep the pipeline 
open, guaranteed oil flows through the pipeline and provided them with an option to buy 
agreement. It was a momentous amount of indemnification without which the pipeline 
would not have been built or overseen in this manner. 
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Trans Mountain 
In May 2018 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that the Government of 
Canada was purchasing the Trans Mountain pipeline and would continue to advocate for 
the expansion proposal attached to the line. This purchase represents the largest single 
indemnification action on the part of the federal government of the pipeline industry. 
However, the steps required to get to this act of nationalisation are many and show a 
pattern of government support even before the outright purchase of the pipeline. This was 
however not the first indemnifying action related to the pipeline project. First Kinder 
Morgan requested direct indemnification for the project should it continue to encounter 
regulatory hurdles, second, they requested monetary investment to help indemnify the 
project, before finally agreeing to take on the complete liability of the pipeline by 
purchasing it fully representing the third and largest indemnification act. Additionally, it 
is key to note that the oil and gas pipeline industry structure at this time exhibited many 
of the characteristics that made it a good candidate for gaining government support. 
Kinder Morgan (the company proposing to expand Trans Mountain) was a large company 
with a high profit rate in a highly concentrated industry. The pipeline proposed was 
concentrated to two provinces along an existing route, taking up comparatively little 
geographic space. While the oil and gas industry could be described as medium in size 
relative to the general economic of Canada, pipeline projects made up a smaller portion of 
them. All of these facets helped Kinder Morgan gain federal government support and 
indemnification that continues to the present day. This will be discussed in further detail 
in the ensuing paragraphs.   
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5.1 The Need to Expand Trans Mountain 
There were a number of reasons put forward initially for the expansion of the 
Trans Mountain pipeline. The decision to propose the pipeline was made in an 
environment of concern regarding the relatively low cost for Alberta oil that could be 
found in the United States compared to higher prices and diversification that could be 
found by shipping oil internationally from Canada’s west coast (Harrison 2019, 61). An 
additional factor brought forward at this time noted how Canada’s investment climate 
would suffer when looked at by international companies in light of numerous issues on 
the part of pipeline companies to get their proposed projects (Trans Mountain or 
otherwise) approved and built (Angevine and Green 2016). Particularly notable about this 
was that the oil and gas industry, while not the biggest industry in Canada made up in 
2013 $133 billion in nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Natural Resources Canada 
2014, 4). This equaled the equivalent of 7.5 percent of total GDP making the industry a 
significant medium size industry to the economy (Ibid). This way of thinking emphasizes 
that the oil sands are a stranded asset of Canada’s which cannot be realized without the 
building of pipelines from the oil sands outward (Ibid). Additional pipelines that can 
connect the oil sands to British Columbia’s coast would therefore provide a mechanism to 
export oil internationally benefiting both Canada and the oil companies operating within 
Canada. These were the primary narratives brought forward by Kinder Morgan when they 
proposed the Trans Mountain expansion project in 2013.  
The proposed expansion of the pipeline was put forward by a large firm and with 
the benefit of new construction requiring very little additional geography from the 
original pipeline itself. Kinder Morgan, a Texas based pipeline company which is the 
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largest energy infrastructure firm in the S&P500, who owned the 1953 pipeline, put the 
expansion project forward. In addition to this line, they operate 84,000 miles of pipelines 
and 157 terminals (Kinder Morgan 2017, 3). The Trans Mountain pipeline had been in 
use since 1953 and is one of Canada’s oldest intra-provincial pipelines that was 
constructed to ensure oil could be sent to the Pacific Northwest market ahead of oil from 
the Texas region (Ibid). The expansion project proposed a second pipeline built parallel to 
the existing pipeline route allowing for a tripling of the amount of oil sent westward. This 
would increase pipeline capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels per day and would 
escalate the amount of diluted bitumen flowing from Edmonton, Alberta to Burnaby, 
British Columbia. Given that the pipeline was pre-existing it would also decrease the 
amount of environmental disruption along the pipeline route compared to alternative 
pipeline proposals contemplated. The need for such a large increase in oil capacity was 
justified as a way for Canada to export more oil to other international particularly Asian 
buyers and bring up $73.5 billion in economic benefits to Canada over the next 20 years 
(Earnest 2015, 7). In this way a large firm proposed a pipeline project that was confined 
to a very specific geographical area.  
However, the increased capacity of this pipeline created extensive opposition from 
a number of groups including First Nations, environmental groups and certain 
municipalities in BC. In particular, concerns about the increased tanker traffic along the 
coast and the environmental threat they posed as well as concerns about climate change 
and how the increase of this pipeline could justify further oil sands expansion 
(Cruichshank 2019). 
 80 
Kinder Morgan once approved took significant action to decrease the risk faced by 
such a large-scale pipeline project. Despite the concerns voiced by opposition groups, on 
May 19, 2016 the NEB released its final report on the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 
stating that “the project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effect,” 
was in the public interest and recommended approval by federal cabinet (National Energy 
Board 2016, 2-3). The board imposed 157 conditions that would have to be fulfilled in the 
event the pipeline went forward, however many groups did not feel key issues such as 
tanker traffic had been addressed by the report (Bakx 2016). On May 29, 2016 the 
expansion was passed by the Trudeau cabinet. Regardless of continued protests along the 
pipeline, on May 30, 2017 Kinder Morgan Canada Ltd debut on the TSX with a $1.75B 
Initial Public Offering (IPO), the fourth-largest IPO in Toronto Stock Exchange history 
(Ashworth 2017). Kinder Morgan by doing this spun off its Canadian holdings into its 
own separate company. This was done in order to fund the money needed in order to 
expand the Trans Mountain, and was also widely seen as a way to buttress against the 
political climate and uncertainty surrounding pipeline approvals (Ibid). While the stock 
was initially priced between $19 and $21 it dropped to the $16 range later in the year 
given the uncertainty of the pipeline project and the price of oil going forward. Kinder 
Morgan had been approved, and the company in seeking financing showed that it was 
willing to take significant action to prevent risks and bolster profits.  
Though the profit rate for Kinder Morgan was high, the company encountered 
numerous continued issues regarding the project. Despite a successful third-quarter in 
2017 of $42.4 million up from $20.3 million the previous year, continued political and 
regulatory issues with the pipeline caused Kinder Morgan on December 4, 2017 to 
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announce what they called a primarily permitting strategy when it came to construction 
on the Trans Mountain (United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2018). This 
strategy meant that the company was focused on the permitting process rather than full 
construction and spending until further assurance could be ensured on permits, approvals 
and judicial reviews that were still in flux (ibid).  This strategy allowed Kinder Morgan to 
begin work on the expansion on December 27, 2017 and the NEB granted the company 
the ability to ignore Burnaby city bylaws full construction was delayed (Kinder Morgan 
2017, 16). This was however not the end of Trans Mountain’s construction issues.  
The beginning of construction was complicated by numerous protests and 
announcements. On January 30, 2018 the BC government announced that it would seek to 
implement additional environmental regulations regarding pipeline safety, spill response 
and restrictions on the amount of diluted bitumen transported through BC (Zussman 
2018). These regulations were aimed to come into effect in 2019 and greatly affected 
Trans Mountain by further delaying an already delayed project. Additional opposition 
occurred when BC Premier John Horgan said that they would pursue the formation of a 
reference case in the provincial Court of Appeal to enquire if a provincial government 
could legally control the shipment of oil through the province on environmental grounds 
(The Canadian Press 2019). This challenge also had the potential to prevent expansion 
projects like Trans Mountain seeking to increase the amount of oil running through BC 
territory. The Trans Mountain project became increasingly contentious and politically 
factious as the province of Alberta (who were in favour of the pipeline) and the province 
of BC came to head about the constitutional ability of provinces to restrict the amount of 
oil being transported through the province (Hoberg 2018, 10). Direct protests additionally 
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continued to occur along the Burnaby route of the pipeline from numerous groups intent 
on preventing construction crews from working to expand the project (The Canadian 
Press 2019). In sum, contentious actions continued to accrue as the months went by 
leading to uncertainties surrounding the project.  
5.2 Indemnification of Trans Mountain 
 It was at this time then that Kinder Morgan first asked the federal government to 
indemnify the pipeline project. On March 6, 2018 after months of delays and challenges 
on the Trans Mountain project, Kinder Morgan representatives met with James Carr, the 
Minister of Natural Resources and his chief of staff in Houston, Texas (United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2018). The meeting focused on the ongoing 
challenges facing the Trans Mountain expansion project. The increased and ongoing 
protests had caused the company to voice that it was “become increasingly concerned that 
without active intervention from the Government of Canada, the Company’s continued 
pursuit of [Trans Mountain expansion] could endanger the Company’s ability to pay 
dividends to its equity holds and maintain its credit ratings.” (Ibid) They stated that 
without government intervention the company would need to take on billions of dollars of 
debt to fund construction of a pipeline whose future, and therefore the company’s ability 
to service this debt remained uncertain (Ibid). Requests were also put forward for the 
federal government to provide clarity and certainty on federal approvals that would show 
the supremacy of federal regulations over provincial initiatives in this area given the 
resistance of the BC government to the project. Finally, the company requested “a 
financial backstop that would keep Shareholders whole in the event of a stoppage or 
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suspension of the [Trans Mountain Expansion Project].” (Ibid) This was the first attempt 
by the company to seek government support and indemnification from the government.  
The details of this indemnification were well constructed by the company and 
quite explicit in their request. Minister Carr agreed at this time that the federal 
government would work with the company in advance of Kinder Morgan’s April 2018 
board meeting on the issues of concern brought forward. Meetings were therefore 
scheduled in person between representative of both parties to discuss potential legislative 
and judicial responses throughout the month of March. This escalated when during 
meetings on March 21st and 24th attended by Kinder Morgan, the Ministry of Finance and 
members of the Prime Minister’s office, Kinder Morgan presented a series of specific 
potential arrangements which included the government taking specific legislative and 
executive actions. This agreement included a proposal that the government provide what 
was termed as a backstop in which the federal government would agree to indemnify 
Kinder Morgan for all Trans Mountain expansion costs incurred in pursuit of expansion if 
the expansion project was abandoned by the company according to its own discretion 
(Ibid). This amounted to a direct request for indemnification of the company on the part 
of the Canadian federal government. While government representatives didn’t 
immediately agree to this proposal, the request on the part of Kinder Morgan is a 
significant recognition of the role that the federal government continues to play today in 
indemnifying the Canadian pipeline industry.  
The explicit and detailed nature of this request shows how the industry structure 
facets outlined by Siegfried and Salamon can aid certain companies in securing 
government support. Their requests show recognition on the part of Kinder Morgan of 
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their own large firm size and market concentration of the pipeline industry in Canada 
enabling them to request something that would not be pursued by smaller companies in 
more crowded industries. Kinder Morgan as a large energy infrastructure company held 
significant lobbying ability. This combined with past government actions, a small 
geographic dispersion of the Trans Mountain pipeline compared to other pipeline 
proposals such as Energy East, and few other alternative options contributed to Kinder 
Morgan’s ability to successfully negotiate with the government.   
Kinder Morgan’s requests then escalated and they requested indemnification 
through direct monetary investment in the project. Further meetings between Kinder 
Morgan and federal government officials on March 26 and 27 discussed the ability of the 
federal government to provide guarantees to the company. At this time the potential for 
Canada to become an equity investor in Trans Mountain Pipeline LP was brought forward 
(Ibid). While discussions were preliminary in nature, government officials stated a 
willingness to provide some form of indemnification, with conditions, that would 
compensate Kinder Morgan for pipeline expansion costs and potentially see the 
government takeover ownership of Trans Mountain to oversee expansion construction 
(Ibid). Kinder Morgan at this time further increased pressure on the government when on 
April 8, 2018 they announced that the Board had suspended all non-essential spending on 
expansion construction and that in light of BC’s continued actions the company would 
not commit additional resources to the project. The company stated that they could not 
put Kinder Morgan shareholders at risk on the remaining amount the company would 
need to spend to continue moving forward with the project (Kinder Morgan 2018, 91).  
Following this, the Premier of Alberta Rachel Notley promised, “Alberta is prepared to 
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do whatever it takes to get this pipeline built – including taking a public position in the 
pipeline. Alberta is prepared to be an investor in the pipeline (Government of Alberta 
2018).” Indemnification through direct monetary investment was very much on the table 
between Kinder Morgan, the federal government and the Alberta provincial government.   
This then led to the final and most extensive indemnification act, in which the 
federal government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline from Kinder Morgan. Clearly 
at this time negotiations were not going well between the two parties, and the federal 
government once again demonstrated their willingness to act as an indemnifier for the 
pipeline industry. Pressure to come to a deal increased between the federal government 
and Kinder Morgan, and although the government of Canada pushed for a backstop 
option on April 30 Kinder Morgan proposed that the government purchase the pipeline 
for $6.5 billion. Canada instead proposed that the offer of a backstop could be made 
available to a private sector buyer of the pipeline and if none came forward then the 
Federal government would purchase the assets of the pipeline for $2.3 billion plus a 
percentage of Kinder Morgan’s sunk costs (United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2018). Kinder Morgan’s board however rejected this proposal and despite 
negotiations having been publicly ongoing between the federal finance Minister Bill 
Morneau and Kinder Morgan for a month no deal had been reached. On May 16, 2018 
Morneau stated publicly that the federal government would be willing to offer Kinder 
Morgan or any other future owner of the Trans Mountain project indemnity for any 
financial losses resulting from political opposition by the BC government who were 
putting up extensive protest and opposition to the project (Alini 2018). While further 
offers were made by the government to protect themselves from the full liability of 
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complete ownership none were accepted by Kinder Morgan until on May 23 Canada 
agreed to purchase the pipeline from Kinder Morgan outright. The Canadian federal 
government had fully indemnified the Trans Mountain pipeline project.  
This decision to completely indemnify the pipeline did not get rid of the numerous 
issues facing its construction. On May 24, 2018, a group of municipalities, First Nations, 
environmental groups and the province of BC challenged NEB approval at the Federal 
Court of Appeal (National Energy Board 2019). Then only a few days later on May 29 
Morneau made the announcement that Canada was purchasing the Trans Mountain 
pipeline for $4.5 billion with Alberta contributing up to $2 billion to cover costs resulting 
from any unforeseen circumstances that might occur (Canada 2018). Financing for the 
project was managed by the Canadian Development Investment Corporation, a holding 
company that owns and manages several crown corporations for the federal government). 
Notably Parliament was not required to review the federal government’s decision because 
the purchase of the pipeline was paid for by the loan from one Crown corporation to 
another on request of the Minister of Finance (Parliamentary Budget Office 2019, 15). 
The pipeline despite having secured financing from the federal government continued to 
face numerous court and regulatory related hurdles that continue as of Spring 2020.  
The Canadian government’s decision to purchase Trans Mountain is key in light 
of what has happened to Kinder Morgan Canada, the Canadian subsidiary of Kinder 
Morgan, since its sale. Much can be learned that supports how an industry and company 
structure can help it secure government support for better or worse. Kinder Morgan 
Canada was spun off from its American parent in the mid-2017 to raise money to expand 
Trans Mountain (The Canadian Press 2019). However, after its sale Kinder Morgan 
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Canada announced the following May that it had decided to remain a stand-alone public 
company after a strategic review within the company which looked at whether the sale of 
part or all of the corporation should move forward. It was then announced in November 
of 2019 that Pembina Pipeline, a Calgary-based company was cleared by the Competition 
Bureau of Canada to buy Kinder Morgan Canada for $4.3B (Ibid). This is key because at 
the time of its initial expansion proposal and the years thereafter the pipeline was backed 
by one of the largest energy infrastructure companies in North America (Otterbourg 
2014). The company was not just large in size, but also one of the few that had the 
resources to put forward proposals of this scope. Other competing companies around 
2013 had put forward their own proposals with Enbridge putting forward their Northern 
Gateway project crossing from Alberta to northern British Columbia and TransCanada 
putting forward the Energy East Pipeline which would go from Alberta east to New 
Brunswick (Hoberg 2013, 377). At the time of negotiation Kinder Morgan had a 
significant amount of sway on a government that felt the need to support the pipeline 
industry (Hoberg 2018, 4). These industry structure factors helped Kinder Morgan secure 
government indemnification.  
Kinder Morgan used the proceeds from the sale of Trans Mountain to pay down 
existing debt and on January 3, 2019 the company distributed the net proceeds from the 
sale to its shareholders as a return of capital totalling approximately $1.2 million 
Canadian (Kinder Morgan 2018, 91). The Canadian government as of early 2020 
continues to own the Trans Mountain pipeline and has committed to spending billions 
expanding the pipeline despite continued cost overruns. On January 2020, the federal 
government stated that they will avoid selling the pipeline as long as political and legal 
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risks remain and until construction is completed (Rabson 2020), effectively continuing to 
indemnify the pipeline and with it the pipeline industry going forward. 
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Conclusion 
CD Howe writing to the Minister of Finance during the 1950’s stated,  
for all pipelines into new markets, a deficiency guarantee has always been 
required … Unfortunately in Canada, no sponsorship other than the Canadian 
government exists which can assume responsibility for so large a project. 
(Kilbourn 1970, 62)  
Howe was speaking of the TransCanada pipeline, but the sentiment has continued since 
that time when it comes to pipeline construction in Canada. A federal government policy 
of indemnification for the pipeline sector has continued since TransCanada, leading to 
greater financial stability for the Canadian pipeline industry in Canada, but more risk and 
little reward for the Canadian taxpayer.  
This thesis has shown that the federal government has supported the oil and gas 
industry through indemnification since the 1950’s. It has done so by using process tracing 
to examine three test cases, the building of the TransCanada pipeline in the 1950’s, the 
Line 9 pipeline from Sarnia to Montreal in the 1970’s and the expansion of the Trans 
Mountain pipeline in the 2010’s. In all cases the federal government worked with pipeline 
companies to provide not just monetary support, but help securing financing, clearing 
regulations and dealing with those who were against or expressed reluctance regarding 
the pipeline. This amounted to $115 million in support to the TransCanada, almost $250 
million to support to Line 9 and just $4.5 billion to outright purchase the Trans Mountain 
line to ensure the project moved forward. In today’s dollars this amounts to the 
government supporting TransCanada in the amount of approximately $1.102 billion and 
support for Line 9 equalling $1.103 billion. The federal government tried to help both 
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TransCanada and Interprovincial to secure financing to build their pipelines, and the 
federal government used its own crown corporations to support both the TransCanada and 
Trans Mountain pipelines. Loans and guarantees against losses were discussed in the case 
of all three pipelines.  
Indemnification in this thesis was defined as the government taking responsibility 
for the large-scale liabilities faced by the industry to guarantee its continued survival 
despite the fact that the sector has encountered significant ongoing issues. In all three 
cases looked at within this thesis the federal government acted as an indemnitor for the 
sector and the companies within it by protecting the risky projects pursued by companies. 
Oil and gas pipeline companies could build in the support of the federal government when 
taking risks because they had done it before for the industry. By examining these cases 
through the lens of indemnification what is typically used as a business and legal term 
becomes political and can be used to examine large-scale long-term government policy.  
Throughout its chapters, this thesis has also shown how industry structure can 
provide an explanation for why the federal government’s policy of indemnification of the 
pipeline industry has continued for the past 70 plus years. When looking at the five 
parameters brought forward by Salamon and Siegfried (1977), the TransCanada pipeline 
showed that a small industry size, large firm size and high market concentration 
encouraged the federal government to support the building of the pipeline. In 
TransCanada’s case the lack of competitors to build the pipeline meant that the federal 
government was locked in to supporting one particular company despite financing issues 
and cost-overruns. However not all of the theories parameters hold to the ideal, in practice 
TransCanada was a paper company when it was first formed to build the pipeline, years 
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later it would post significant profits, but while it was lobbying the government it had 
very little money to its name. By the same token, the TransCanada pipeline had huge 
geographical span that covered over 2400 miles (Clark 1985, 99), but was successful 
gaining the support of CD Howe and the government it can be argued because of and not 
in spite of its size. The Line 9 pipeline showed that a large firm size, high profit rate and 
market concentration helped them maintain indemnification by the federal government. 
Additionally, the concentration of the pipeline helped to limit complications for the 
pipeline while still connecting a major population (Montreal) and industry sectors 
(Sarnia) in Canada. However, while the pipeline industry as a whole in Canada cannot be 
described as large, the growing of the Alberta extractive industry combined with the 
increased manufacturing and commercial uses for oil and gas as compared to the 1950’s 
showcases how the industry size of the industry increased overtime. This does not seem 
to have significantly affected Interprovincial’s ability to maintain government 
indemnification but does stray from what might have been a larger factor in another 
industry.  
In the same way, for Trans Mountain the pipeline was supported in an 
environment in which Kinder Morgan was a large company in a concentrated industry 
with high profit rates trying to build a pipeline in a relatively concentrated geographical 
space. The ongoing medium size of the industry may however be explained by the 
perception of a growing need to transport oil and now and in the future. The fear of future 
oil shocks in the 1970’s and the international oil markets that could be captured through 
pipeline expansion west may have superseded the growth of the industry. In these ways 
while the theory put forward generally provides an explanation for federal 
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indemnification of the pipeline industry, there are a few indices that do not fit exactly into 
the model.  
There are a number of other possible explanations for government indemnification 
and support of pipeline projects overtime. First amongst them is the idea of pipeline 
projects as nation-building infrastructure projects and that government support of them is 
simply a way of Canada asserting its own nationalism by supporting this industry. This 
explanation fit best perhaps with the building of the TransCanada pipeline, as CD Howe 
the Canadian politician pushing the most for the pipeline often compared the building of 
the pipeline to the building of the railroad (Gray 1970, 56). This is however a harder sell 
for the Line 9 and Trans Mountain pipelines, and while talk of government support being 
“in the national interest” occurred it is difficult to determine if the pipeline was supported 
due to national interest or if national interest was used as an explanatory factor once 
indemnifying actions had already been decided upon (Harrison 2019). Another possible 
explanation is the influence of American economic influence on government support for 
pipeline construction within the country overtime. Many of the acts on the part of the 
United States in regard to pricing, capital, regulation and government policy precipitated 
indemnifying actions by the federal government of Canadian pipelines. This thesis did not 
look at any pipelines that crossed international boundaries, as it would have widened the 
scope of the project to an unmanageable size. However, examining this line of inquiry 
could lead to greater understanding of how and in what way government policies of 
indemnification take place. These explanations as well as examinations of factors that 
influenced government support beyond industry structure such as staples theory, 
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institutionalist explanations or a further examination of how international finance shapes 
large scale infrastructure and resource projects could prove fruitful.  
The work in this project focused mainly on laying the foundation of providing 
support for the idea of indemnification as a concept to explain government support for 
private industry and showcasing how it has occurred in the context of the Canadian 
pipeline industry. Further work can and should be done to not only look at the role 
indemnification played in numerous other pipeline cases throughout Canadian history, but 
also the justifications and explanations for why that indemnification took place overtime. 
By examining examples of Canadian pipelines that either were not built or were built 
without government support a greater understanding and case for how a policy of 
indemnification shapes the industry can be drawn. As described earlier in this thesis while 
much work has been done examining the resistance to pipelines (Garneau 2016; MacNeil 
and Paterson 2018; Carter 2018) and the National Energy Board (Priddle 1999: Doern 
and Toner 2019) but in contrast little has been done to look at government support of 
pipeline projects in Canada from their inception and how this changes overtime. 
Examining all stages of the lifecycle of a pipeline can help to challenge common 
portrayals of the relationship between the pipeline sector and the Canadian federal 
government. By bringing business terms and concepts such as indemnification from 
business and law literature (Voigtmann and Clifford 2018; Rylands 2015), into the 
political realm non-political terms such as indemnification, risk-management and 
mitigation can be examined to paint a clearer picture of a government industry 
relationship.    
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When CD Howe wrote to say that all pipelines built into new markets had to be 
supported by the federal government, he could not have foreseen how long this policy 
would stay in place. The federal government’s purchase of the Trans Mountain pipeline is 
not a once in a century event but a result of the long-term indemnification of the pipeline 
industry. To deny this reality is to fail to bring forward facts that are needed when 
critically examining the way that the pipeline industry works in Canada. This is true 
whether you are on the left trying to advocate for more public ownership of the means of 
production or on the right pushing for a free market approach to the economy. It is only 
when examining government indemnification policy over a long period of time that an 
accurate picture of how intertwined these entities truly are becomes clear.  
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